Battle of Petersburg – The Attacks Begin

While Sheridan was out on raiding the Virginia Central Railroad, and trying to attract the attention of Robert E. Lee. Grant and Meade began to put their plan to attack Petersburg into action. The movement began on the night of June 12, and work began on an over 2000 foot pontoon bridge across the James River. The Union army began crossing on June 14, and all the men were not across until the 18^th. However, they did not wait that long to strike at Petersburg. The advance on that town began on June 15. Leading the Federal army was Benjamin Butler's Army of the James, which had already failed to capture Petersburg once during the Bermuda Hundred Campaign.

Petersburg was very weakly held. Lee had not realized that Grant was attacking Petersburg with his entire army, and so remained north of the James. The commander at Petersburg was P. G. T. Beauregard. He still had to deal with Butler on the Bermuda Hundred, so he only had 2,200 men to hold the Petersburg defenses.

Smith

As “Baldy” Smith, commander of the XVIII corps, approached Petersburg on June 15^th, 150 years ago today, he was worried about the strength of its entrenchments. There were six foot high breastworks surrounded by a ditch six feet deep and fifteen wide. In front of this obstacle was a row of felled trees with branches sharpened to delay the attackers while they were shot at from the walls. Smith spent time examining the positions, and looking for weak spots. By 4 pm he had decided to attack with heavy skirmish lines, hoping that they would not suffer heavily from Confederate fire during the charge. He set the launch off time at 5 pm, but it was discovered that no one had told the artillery chief of the plans. The guns were needed for supporting fire while the infantry attacked. The artillery horses had been sent away for water, and could not pull the guns into position. Smith delayed the attack until 7 pm, when his troops were able to move forward.

When Smith's men charged these works, they found them much less formidable than they had imagined. As they pushed backed the skirmishers, crossed the abatis and climbed the ditch, they quickly gained the walls meeting little resistance. Many batteries were captured by Smith's advance over more than a mile of entrenchments. At this point, however, Smith halted the assault. The Confederates fell back to a weaker line, and Smith thought it likely that Lee had crossed the James and was in his front. He wanted to prepare his men to meet a counter-attack, not continue forward. Winfield Scott Hancock arrived, ahead of his corps, and although the senior officer on the field and normally aggressive, he acquiesced to Smith's decision. No more attacks would be made that night.

Hancock

Battle of North Anna

Although the Union forces in the east were meeting defeat on almost every side, most recently at the Battle of Spotsylvania, Grant was not discouraged. One of his greatest strengths was his perseverance. Where others would have quickly retreated, Grant stayed and fought it out. Grant did not want to just move around Lee's right flank as he had done before, since the Confederates would just fall back to strong positions behind the North Anna River. So he sent Hancock's II Corps to move as a feint to try to lure Lee into attacking him on open ground. Lee did not fall for the trick. Instead he fell back behind the North Anna, and Grant missed hitting him on the road.

Grant moved forward at a more leisurely pace, and on May 23 the Federals arrived at the North Anna. They quickly realized that Lee had miscalculated. He believed that the Federals would not try a serious crossing of the North Anna, and the movement there was only a diversion to cover a flanking movement to the east. He had left the North Anna River crossings either lightly guarded, or not defended at all. Hancock's II Corps moved down the Telegraph Road toward Chesterfield Bridge, while to the west Warren moved to cross at Jericho Mills with his V Corps. Hancock's men found one small redoubt guarding the bridge. After an artillery bombardment they charged at 6 pm, drove the Confederates from their position, and captured the bridge before the rebels could burn it.

Pontoon at Jericho Mills

Upsteam at Jericho Mills Warren had forded the river without any resistance. As more troops crossed he formed his men in a battle line of three divisions. The Confederates got wind of this crossing, but the Confederates still believed it was a feint, and A. P. Hill sent only one division, that of Major General Cadmus Wilcox, to deal with the threat. They were greatly outnumbered, but they were able to drive the Federals back, throwing one division into panic. The attack was stalled by well placed Federal artillery, and then recoiled when a Federal brigade struck Wilcox's flank. Wilcox determined he could do nothing more against the Federal beachhead. Lee was upset that the Federals had made it across the river. He said to Hill, “[W]hy did you let those people cross here? Why didn't you throw your whole force on them and drive them back as Jackson would have done?”

The Confederate position on the bluffs running along the North Anna River had been compromised by the Union crossing. However, Lee and his chief engineer soon came up with a brilliant solution. Both Confederate flanks were pulled back into a V formation with the point resting on the river. That way they could keep the Federal forces divided, and hold one at bay while crushing the other. But at this critical moment Lee was sick and confined to his bed. “We must strike them a blow," he said in his tent, "we must never let them pass us again - we must strike them a blow." On May 24^th the Federals continued to cross the river. Approaching the Confederate lines, they found them to be as strong as those at Spotyslvania. Instead of trying to attack, Grant ordered his army to dig in, and the campaign turned briefly into a stalemate. Probes were made at various places along the Confederate line, but nowhere was a weak point found where Grant and Meade could attack with a good chance of success. Grant, however, remained sanguine in his letters to Washington:

Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the actions of his Army show it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of entrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured.

Chesterfield Bridge

Battle of the Wilderness – Hancock Attacks

George Meade wished to strike Hill as well as Ewell, and he ordered Winfield Hancock to the area with his II Corps. The corps was spread over many miles of roads and it took time to bring them into position. Meade grew tired of the delay, and gave Getty a peremptory order to attack with what he had. Without Hancock's men the attack did not have the force to crush the Confederate lines. The forces met in the thick woods, and each fired through the smoky darkness, unable to see their enemy. Hancock sent into two of his divisions, but they were unable to resolve the conflict.

Hancock

At first the only Confederate troops on hand were Henry Heth's division, but Wilcox was sent to reinforce him, and with the fresh men the Confederates attacked. One soldier recalled the fight:

As soon as the line was formed and dressed, the order to advance was given. Balls fired at Heth's division, in front of us, fell among us at the beginning of our advance. We pressed on, guide left, through the thick undergrowth, until we reached Heth's line, now much thinned and exhausted. We had very imprudently begun to cheer before this. We passed over this line cheering. There was no use of this. We should have charged without uttering a word until within a few yards of the Federal line. As it was, we drew upon ourselves a terrific volley of musketry. The advance was greatly impeded by the matted growth of saplings and bushes, and in the delay a scattering fire commenced along our line.

The rebels gained an initial success, but they soon encountered the same problems that had plagued the Federals. They could not launch a successful charge in the woods of the Wilderness. In an attempt to break the stalemate, James Wadsworth's division of the V Corps was ordered to strike Hill's flank. They headed straight into the gap between the two Confederate corps. The vegetation delayed the advance, but by 7 pm they were nearing Hill's flank. Lee had nothing with which to combat this threat except a 150 man strong battalion from Alabama that had been guarding prisoners. He sent these men forward with a yell, and this small charge was able to convince the Federals to halt their attacks for the night. If the Federals had pressed home their attack, it could have resulted in a disaster for the Southern arms.

Although the fighting ceased, it was a horrible night for the wounded on both sides. There had been little rain for some time, and the musketry ignited the dry woods and fields. The fires quickly spread, and many of the wounded, unable to escape the flames, had the torture of being burnt alive. One Federal remembered:

I saw many wounded soldiers in the Wilderness who hung on to their rifles, and whose intention was clearly stamped on their pallid faces. I saw one man, both of whose legs were broken, lying on the ground with his cocked rifle by his side and his ramrod in his hand, and his eyes set on the front. I knew he meant to kill himself in case of fire—knew it is surely as though I could read his thoughts. 

Battle of the Wilderness Begins

The Union army continued marching through the Wilderness on the morning of May 5^th. The Confederate Second Corps under Richard S. Ewell advanced to strike the column, and skirmishing broke out in Saunders Field, a rare open area in the thick woods of the Wilderness. Grant's goal was to destroy Lee's army, so he had told his generals, “"If any opportunity presents itself of pitching into a part of Lee's army, do so without giving time for disposition.” This is just what the Federals did. Their advance halted and Gouverneur Warren, commander of the V Corps, deployed to attack the greycoats.

Wilderness Church

The battle soon began to demonstrate the distinctive of the Overland Campaign. As Ewell's men arrived, instead of driving towards the enemy they began digging breastworks. As Warren deployed his men, he also did not attack, as he saw the Confederate position extended beyond his flank. He wanted to wait until Sedgwick brought up his VI Corps, but Meade was impatient. It had already taken a long time to deploy in the thick forest, and so he ordered Warren to attack.

As the Federals advanced at 1 pm, they found it impossible to stay aligned in the difficult terrain. They lines were already thrown into disarray when they reached Saunders Field. They reformed as best they could at the edge of the field, and then charged toward Ewell's men. They were met by heavy fire, and the attack was unsuccessful. As Warren had feared, the overlapped Union flank was hit by enfilading fire, and Romeyn Ayres' brigade on that flank had to take cover. Joseph Bartlett's brigade made some progress, and secured a portion of the Confederate line, but without support he was forced into retreat. The famed Iron Brigade attacked, but it was unusually repulsed. Warren ordered artillery to move into Saunders Field to support his infantry, but the Confederates counterattacked after the retreating Federals, and were able to capture the guns with hand to hand fighting. At 3 pm, after Warren's attacks had been driven back, Sedgwick arrived on his right. He attacked Ewell's lines, but after an hour of back and forth fighting both sides pulled back and dug in.

Artillery in the Wilderness

Several miles to the south, the Confederate Third Corps under A. P. Hill had also struck the Federal lines, moving along the Orange Plank Road, parallel to the Turnpike, down which Ewell had attacked. Hill was not able to achieve a surprise like Ewell. He pressed forward, skirmishing heavily with Union cavalry who were trying to defend the intersection with the Brock Road. Just as the Confederates were able to capture it, the Federals were reinforced by the division of George Getty, which stopped the southern advance with a volley. 

Although thus far the Confederate advance had not been unsuccessful, there was a major flaw in their dispositions. There was a large gap between Ewell and Hill which, if they could overcome the terrain, the Federals could exploit to great advantage. The point was driven home when blue skirmishers appeared on the edge of field of the Widow Tapp house, where Lee had established his headquarters. The Confederate generals made it to safety, but it was clear that this problem needed to be addressed.