Battle of Petersburg – The Attacks Begin

While Sheridan was out on raiding the Virginia Central Railroad, and trying to attract the attention of Robert E. Lee. Grant and Meade began to put their plan to attack Petersburg into action. The movement began on the night of June 12, and work began on an over 2000 foot pontoon bridge across the James River. The Union army began crossing on June 14, and all the men were not across until the 18^th. However, they did not wait that long to strike at Petersburg. The advance on that town began on June 15. Leading the Federal army was Benjamin Butler's Army of the James, which had already failed to capture Petersburg once during the Bermuda Hundred Campaign.

Petersburg was very weakly held. Lee had not realized that Grant was attacking Petersburg with his entire army, and so remained north of the James. The commander at Petersburg was P. G. T. Beauregard. He still had to deal with Butler on the Bermuda Hundred, so he only had 2,200 men to hold the Petersburg defenses.

Smith

As “Baldy” Smith, commander of the XVIII corps, approached Petersburg on June 15^th, 150 years ago today, he was worried about the strength of its entrenchments. There were six foot high breastworks surrounded by a ditch six feet deep and fifteen wide. In front of this obstacle was a row of felled trees with branches sharpened to delay the attackers while they were shot at from the walls. Smith spent time examining the positions, and looking for weak spots. By 4 pm he had decided to attack with heavy skirmish lines, hoping that they would not suffer heavily from Confederate fire during the charge. He set the launch off time at 5 pm, but it was discovered that no one had told the artillery chief of the plans. The guns were needed for supporting fire while the infantry attacked. The artillery horses had been sent away for water, and could not pull the guns into position. Smith delayed the attack until 7 pm, when his troops were able to move forward.

When Smith's men charged these works, they found them much less formidable than they had imagined. As they pushed backed the skirmishers, crossed the abatis and climbed the ditch, they quickly gained the walls meeting little resistance. Many batteries were captured by Smith's advance over more than a mile of entrenchments. At this point, however, Smith halted the assault. The Confederates fell back to a weaker line, and Smith thought it likely that Lee had crossed the James and was in his front. He wanted to prepare his men to meet a counter-attack, not continue forward. Winfield Scott Hancock arrived, ahead of his corps, and although the senior officer on the field and normally aggressive, he acquiesced to Smith's decision. No more attacks would be made that night.

Hancock

Battle of North Anna

Although the Union forces in the east were meeting defeat on almost every side, most recently at the Battle of Spotsylvania, Grant was not discouraged. One of his greatest strengths was his perseverance. Where others would have quickly retreated, Grant stayed and fought it out. Grant did not want to just move around Lee's right flank as he had done before, since the Confederates would just fall back to strong positions behind the North Anna River. So he sent Hancock's II Corps to move as a feint to try to lure Lee into attacking him on open ground. Lee did not fall for the trick. Instead he fell back behind the North Anna, and Grant missed hitting him on the road.

Grant moved forward at a more leisurely pace, and on May 23 the Federals arrived at the North Anna. They quickly realized that Lee had miscalculated. He believed that the Federals would not try a serious crossing of the North Anna, and the movement there was only a diversion to cover a flanking movement to the east. He had left the North Anna River crossings either lightly guarded, or not defended at all. Hancock's II Corps moved down the Telegraph Road toward Chesterfield Bridge, while to the west Warren moved to cross at Jericho Mills with his V Corps. Hancock's men found one small redoubt guarding the bridge. After an artillery bombardment they charged at 6 pm, drove the Confederates from their position, and captured the bridge before the rebels could burn it.

Pontoon at Jericho Mills

Upsteam at Jericho Mills Warren had forded the river without any resistance. As more troops crossed he formed his men in a battle line of three divisions. The Confederates got wind of this crossing, but the Confederates still believed it was a feint, and A. P. Hill sent only one division, that of Major General Cadmus Wilcox, to deal with the threat. They were greatly outnumbered, but they were able to drive the Federals back, throwing one division into panic. The attack was stalled by well placed Federal artillery, and then recoiled when a Federal brigade struck Wilcox's flank. Wilcox determined he could do nothing more against the Federal beachhead. Lee was upset that the Federals had made it across the river. He said to Hill, “[W]hy did you let those people cross here? Why didn't you throw your whole force on them and drive them back as Jackson would have done?”

The Confederate position on the bluffs running along the North Anna River had been compromised by the Union crossing. However, Lee and his chief engineer soon came up with a brilliant solution. Both Confederate flanks were pulled back into a V formation with the point resting on the river. That way they could keep the Federal forces divided, and hold one at bay while crushing the other. But at this critical moment Lee was sick and confined to his bed. “We must strike them a blow," he said in his tent, "we must never let them pass us again - we must strike them a blow." On May 24^th the Federals continued to cross the river. Approaching the Confederate lines, they found them to be as strong as those at Spotyslvania. Instead of trying to attack, Grant ordered his army to dig in, and the campaign turned briefly into a stalemate. Probes were made at various places along the Confederate line, but nowhere was a weak point found where Grant and Meade could attack with a good chance of success. Grant, however, remained sanguine in his letters to Washington:

Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the actions of his Army show it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of entrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured.

Chesterfield Bridge

Battle of Spotsylvania Begins

Having decided to move to Spotsylvania, Grant's men continued to march in that direction on the night of May 7^th. At the front Sheridan's cavalry had to clear the road of Confederate cavalry. Lee was not certain where Grant was going, but ordered Richard Anderson, who had taken over Longstreet's corps, to move in the direction of Spotsylvania. He did not tell him the movement was urgent, but Anderson moved early, at 10 pm on May 7^th, to escape the stinking bodies and burning forest on the Wilderness battlefield.

Early on May 8^th, 150 years ago today, the Federal cavalry renewed their efforts to clear the road to Spotsylvania. Fitzhugh Lee's men, after a gallant stand, withdrew from their barricades and took up a new position on Laurel Hill, just northwest of Spotsylvania. He sent for Anderson to help, and at this point the Confederates' early movement paid off. Before long infantry were flying into the cavalry positions, just as Warren's V Corps arrived to attack. Warren did not know that the Confederates had infantry on the field, and ordered his troops to press forward. The men were tired and hungry from their long march, but Warren shouted, “Never mind the cannon! Never mind the bullets! Press on and clear this road! It’s the only way to get your rations!" The Federals charged, but at 60 yards the Confederates unleashed volley after volley. The bluecoats fell back and tried again, but again they were beaten back. Warren, seeing more Confederate infantry arriving, halted his attacks and told Meade of the situation.

Lines at Spotsylvania

Meade could not believe that the Confederates had arrived on the field so soon. He ordered John Sedgwick to join Warren and continue the attacks. Much time was spent in preparing the lines, and by the time they advanced at 6 pm, Ewell's Corps had joined Anderson's on the battlefield. The Federal assault was a disaster. Orders were confused, units lost their way, and only one division and one brigade ended up attacking. This weak force had no chance of breaking the Confederate line, and the Federals were soon broken.

They day had been a provident success for the Southerners. The Federal movement had been detected, and infantry was on hand to meet it. They had won the race for Spotsylvaia, and the attack which the Union had spent so long planning turned out to be an embarrassing failure.  

Battle of the Wilderness – Hancock Attacks

George Meade wished to strike Hill as well as Ewell, and he ordered Winfield Hancock to the area with his II Corps. The corps was spread over many miles of roads and it took time to bring them into position. Meade grew tired of the delay, and gave Getty a peremptory order to attack with what he had. Without Hancock's men the attack did not have the force to crush the Confederate lines. The forces met in the thick woods, and each fired through the smoky darkness, unable to see their enemy. Hancock sent into two of his divisions, but they were unable to resolve the conflict.

Hancock

At first the only Confederate troops on hand were Henry Heth's division, but Wilcox was sent to reinforce him, and with the fresh men the Confederates attacked. One soldier recalled the fight:

As soon as the line was formed and dressed, the order to advance was given. Balls fired at Heth's division, in front of us, fell among us at the beginning of our advance. We pressed on, guide left, through the thick undergrowth, until we reached Heth's line, now much thinned and exhausted. We had very imprudently begun to cheer before this. We passed over this line cheering. There was no use of this. We should have charged without uttering a word until within a few yards of the Federal line. As it was, we drew upon ourselves a terrific volley of musketry. The advance was greatly impeded by the matted growth of saplings and bushes, and in the delay a scattering fire commenced along our line.

The rebels gained an initial success, but they soon encountered the same problems that had plagued the Federals. They could not launch a successful charge in the woods of the Wilderness. In an attempt to break the stalemate, James Wadsworth's division of the V Corps was ordered to strike Hill's flank. They headed straight into the gap between the two Confederate corps. The vegetation delayed the advance, but by 7 pm they were nearing Hill's flank. Lee had nothing with which to combat this threat except a 150 man strong battalion from Alabama that had been guarding prisoners. He sent these men forward with a yell, and this small charge was able to convince the Federals to halt their attacks for the night. If the Federals had pressed home their attack, it could have resulted in a disaster for the Southern arms.

Although the fighting ceased, it was a horrible night for the wounded on both sides. There had been little rain for some time, and the musketry ignited the dry woods and fields. The fires quickly spread, and many of the wounded, unable to escape the flames, had the torture of being burnt alive. One Federal remembered:

I saw many wounded soldiers in the Wilderness who hung on to their rifles, and whose intention was clearly stamped on their pallid faces. I saw one man, both of whose legs were broken, lying on the ground with his cocked rifle by his side and his ramrod in his hand, and his eyes set on the front. I knew he meant to kill himself in case of fire—knew it is surely as though I could read his thoughts. 

Battle of the Wilderness Begins

The Union army continued marching through the Wilderness on the morning of May 5^th. The Confederate Second Corps under Richard S. Ewell advanced to strike the column, and skirmishing broke out in Saunders Field, a rare open area in the thick woods of the Wilderness. Grant's goal was to destroy Lee's army, so he had told his generals, “"If any opportunity presents itself of pitching into a part of Lee's army, do so without giving time for disposition.” This is just what the Federals did. Their advance halted and Gouverneur Warren, commander of the V Corps, deployed to attack the greycoats.

Wilderness Church

The battle soon began to demonstrate the distinctive of the Overland Campaign. As Ewell's men arrived, instead of driving towards the enemy they began digging breastworks. As Warren deployed his men, he also did not attack, as he saw the Confederate position extended beyond his flank. He wanted to wait until Sedgwick brought up his VI Corps, but Meade was impatient. It had already taken a long time to deploy in the thick forest, and so he ordered Warren to attack.

As the Federals advanced at 1 pm, they found it impossible to stay aligned in the difficult terrain. They lines were already thrown into disarray when they reached Saunders Field. They reformed as best they could at the edge of the field, and then charged toward Ewell's men. They were met by heavy fire, and the attack was unsuccessful. As Warren had feared, the overlapped Union flank was hit by enfilading fire, and Romeyn Ayres' brigade on that flank had to take cover. Joseph Bartlett's brigade made some progress, and secured a portion of the Confederate line, but without support he was forced into retreat. The famed Iron Brigade attacked, but it was unusually repulsed. Warren ordered artillery to move into Saunders Field to support his infantry, but the Confederates counterattacked after the retreating Federals, and were able to capture the guns with hand to hand fighting. At 3 pm, after Warren's attacks had been driven back, Sedgwick arrived on his right. He attacked Ewell's lines, but after an hour of back and forth fighting both sides pulled back and dug in.

Artillery in the Wilderness

Several miles to the south, the Confederate Third Corps under A. P. Hill had also struck the Federal lines, moving along the Orange Plank Road, parallel to the Turnpike, down which Ewell had attacked. Hill was not able to achieve a surprise like Ewell. He pressed forward, skirmishing heavily with Union cavalry who were trying to defend the intersection with the Brock Road. Just as the Confederates were able to capture it, the Federals were reinforced by the division of George Getty, which stopped the southern advance with a volley. 

Although thus far the Confederate advance had not been unsuccessful, there was a major flaw in their dispositions. There was a large gap between Ewell and Hill which, if they could overcome the terrain, the Federals could exploit to great advantage. The point was driven home when blue skirmishers appeared on the edge of field of the Widow Tapp house, where Lee had established his headquarters. The Confederate generals made it to safety, but it was clear that this problem needed to be addressed.

Overland Campaign Begins

The Union campaign of 1864 in the east began in early May. The army was still under the command of George Meade, but U. S. Grant, commander of all the United State's armies, was on hand to directly supervise him. The Federals crossed at several points on the Rapidan River on May 4, and began heading for Wilderness Tavern. They were marching into an area called the Wilderness. It was characterized by a thick forest that made movements difficult. Hooker had been defeated there in the Battle of Chancellorsville the previous year, and the terrain made it difficult for the Federals to use their greater numbers effectively. Grant and Meade hoped to bypass this dangerous piece of ground before the Confederates could engage them in battle.

Robert E. Lee's Confederate army was spread out to the west of where the Federals crossed. He guessed the Federals plan before they even crossed the river, and determined to try to catch Grant in the Wilderness, where his army would be most vulnerable. On the first day's march the Union troops were unable to make it out of the difficult terrain before nightfall. The Confederates were able to get within striking distance, and the two armies camped only a few miles from each other, destined to meet the next day.  

Mine Run Campaign

Since the Battle of Gettysburg the armies in Virginia had not met in a major battle. But both Meade and Lee maneuvered and skirmished, trying to gain an advantage over the other. At the end of November and beginning of December this would result in the Mine Run Campaign. Meade tried to gain a march on Lee and strike his right across the Rapidan river. But the Federals got bogged down while crossing the river, and Lee was alerted to their movement. He sent the Second Corps, under the temporary command of Jubal Early, to meet the Federal advance. Spearheaded by the Stonewall Division under “Allegheny” Johnson, the Yankee movement was blunted.

Lee

That night Lee withdrew to a line of prepared fortifications along Mine Run. Meade planned to attack on December 1, but after a heavy bombardment he was convinced that Lee's position was too strong. Lee gave orders to hit to Union left flank, which his cavalry had discovered was in the air. But when the southerners move out the next day, they found the Union position empty. Meade had fallen back during the night. Lee was very frustrated with this, and said, “I am too old to command this army. We never should have permitted those people to get away.” This ended the campaigning in Virginia for 1863. 

Meade Crosses the Rappohannock

Lee

There was no major battle between the armies of Meade and Lee after the fight at Gettysburg in July, 1863. The time had been spent in preparations and maneuvers, most recently in October's Bristoe Campaign, which ended with the armies right back where they started. In late October the Confederate retreated behind the Rappohannock River. Intended to make their winter quarters there. Meade wanted to cross the river at Fredericksburg, moving around Lee's eastern flank, but the government in Washington insisted on an attack on the front.

He believed the found a weakness in Lee's line, where several units remained north of the river, connected to the rest only by a pontoon bridge. Lee hoped that by holding this bridgehead he could threaten any movements that Meade might make. But Meade decided to strike it with the troops of John Sedgwick, while at the same time William French's men crossed the river several miles downstream.

The Battle of the Rappohannock began 150 years ago today on November 7, 1863. When Lee got word of the Federal movements he decided to have the force at Rappohannock Station try to hold out under Sedgwick's attacks, while the rest of the army focused on crushing French. There were 2,000 men in the division of Jubal Early which held the bridgehead, and they came under artillery fire around 3 pm. As the afternoon wore on with no sign of a further attack, the Confederate believed they were safe. But at dusk a blue line appeared heading towards them at the double quick. Before the Confederates could beat them back, the Yankees were over the entrenchments, fighting them hand-to-hand. Within minutes the Confederates had their lines overrun and their retreat cut off with the capture of the pontoon bridge. Some rebels tried to swim the cold river, but most lay down their arms, realizing further resistance was futile.

The Confederates lost nearly 17,000 men, 80% of those engaged. The Federals lost only 419. The Northerners were able to gain this quick and glorious victory because the Confederates had allowed themselves to be surprised in a position where their retreat could easily be cut off. That evening Walter Taylor, on Lee's staff, wrote that it was “the saddest chapter in the history of this army. …  Miserable, miserable, miserable management.” With this defeat overturning his plans, Lee fell back, south of the Rapidan.

Bristoe Campaign

No great battles had been fought in the eastern theater of the Civil War after Lee's defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg. Meade had failed to aggressively pursue the Confederates, and he received much criticism for this from Washington. Back in Virginia, both army commanders began trying to maneuver the other into a position where they could fight to advance. Lee was down to two corps after the detachment of Longstreet to fight with Bragg at Chicakamuga, Meade pushed his troops forward, preparing to cross the Rapidan and strike the Confederate positions, but he lost two corps, sent to aid in defending Chattanooga.

When Lee heard of this movement, he saw it as a great opportunity to strike. He began moving around Meade's right flank with his troops. Meade saw that the position was disadvantageous to the Federals, so he decided to fall back, even though he had the superior numbers. He began moving north 150 years ago today. The maneuvering and fighting in Virginia would continue into November, both sides looking for an opportunity to strike.

Lee Crosses the Potomac

After being defeated in the Battle of Gettysburg by Meade's Army of the Potomac, Robert E. Lee began retreating back towards Virginia with his Army of Northern Virginia. Although they had suffered greatly in the three days of fighting and many of their comrades had fallen in the fields and woods of Pennsylvania, the morale of the rest of Lee's army remained high. The Confederates met some resistance from the pursuing Federals. A significant part of the 15 mile wagon train was lost. Stuart's cavalry, which had been absent from the army during the advance north, now did good service in covering the retreat.

The main part of the Union army didn't follow right behind Lee. Meade was not sure that Lee was really returning to Virginia, and he stayed to the east side of South Mountain to cover Baltimore and Washington. When the Confederates reached the Potomac River, they found a serious problem. On July 7th heavy rain had fallen, turning the roads into mud, and this deluge of water had also raised the river so that it could not be crossed. Lee could do nothing except arrange his men in defensive positions with the river to their back and wait for the water to fall.

Lee's Earthworks

As the Federal troops arrived opposite the Confederates on July 12, they found them just finishing strong earthworks complete with gun emplacements. Meade considered attacking, but in a council of war that night he found that only two of the officers present supported an attack. Henry Halleck was upset and telegraphed him:

You are strong enough to attack and defeat the enemy before he can effect a crossing. Act upon your own judgment and make your generals execute your orders. Call no council of war. It is proverbial that councils of war never fight. Re-enforcements are pushed on as rapidly as possible. Do not let the enemy escape.

Lee crossing the Potomac

On the other side of the entrenchments Lee was hoping that Meade would attack. But that was not to be. Meade was not willing to risk a fight, and on the night of July 13-14 the river had fallen enough for Lee to make his escape. He had suffered about 5,000 casualties in the retreat, mostly captured, but he had successfully extricated his defeated army from deep in the enemy's country. President Lincoln was disappointed at Meade's failure to capture Lee. He said:

We had them within our grasp! We had only to stretch forth our hands, and they were ours, and nothing I could say, or do, could make this army move. … This is a dreadful reminiscence of McClellan; it is the same spirit as moved him to claim a great victory, because Pennsylvania and Maryland were safe. Will our Generals never get that idea out of their heads? The whole country is our soil.

Gettysburg – Lee Retreats

Lee crosses the Potomac

The failure of Pickett's charge signaled the end of Confederate offensives at Gettysburg. Lee's offensive strength had been used up. The army had tried for two days the break the same Union line, and they had failed. The only question remaining was what would be Meade's response on the 4th of July, 150 years ago today? Would he follow the example of George B. McClellan in the Seven Days and retreat after winning a victory? Would he just remain in position? Or would he attack the greatly weakened Confederate army? Lee kept his men in position hoping that Meade might withdraw from his lines. But as rain began to fall in the early afternoon, it became clear that Meade would not move, and Lee began making preparations for a withdrawal back to Virginia. That night the Confederate army set out, first Hill, then Longstreet and finally Ewell bringing up the rear.

Gettysburg – Pickett's Charge

As the fighting was raging on Culp's Hill, Longstreet was still trying get Lee to cancel the attack entirely. He later remembered telling him:

General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as anyone, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men every arranged for battle can take that position.

Lee would not listen to Longstreet, remaining unconvinced and believing it was too late to change the plan. But he did decide to shift the focus of the attack from the Confederate right to the center as the troops on the right were too hard to disengage. Supporting Pickett would be brigades from Heth and Pender. These divisions suffered heavily on the first day, and they were now commanded by Pettigrew and Trimble. The charge would be very difficult, across a long portion of open ground on the Federals on Cemetery Ridge. To make the assault easier, it would be preceded by an artillery bombardment by Colonel Porter Alexander. Alexander, however, only had enough ammunition for one more bombardment. The fate of the battle of Gettysburg would hang upon this change.

Union line

At about 1 pm 163 Confederate guns along a mile long artillery line opened upon the Cemetery Ridge. It was the largest artillery bombardment of the Civil War. It was a terrible experience for the Union troops at which it was directed. One veteran later wrote:

It makes my Blood Tingle in my veins now; to think of. Never before did I hear such a roar of Artillery, it seemed as if all the Demons in Hell were let loose, and were Howling through the Air. Turn your eyes which way you will the whole Heavens were filled with Shot and Shell, Fire and Smoke.

Although noisy and terrifying, the Confederate bombardment did did not do terrific damage. It was well nigh impossible to aim with the clouds of smoke which quickly covered the ridge, and most Confederate shells went over the Union soldier's heads. Even many which were aimed properly failed to explode. After an hour bombardment, the time had come for the infantry to advance. Pickett found Longstreet and asked him if he should attack. Longstreet, believing the attack would be useless, could not bring himself to give the order, and so simply sadly nodded his head. The orders were given, and the attack moved out. Riding along his lines, Pickett said, “Up, Men, and to your posts! Don't forget today that you are from Old Virginia!” Nine brigades containing 13,000 men moved out, with more available to support a breakthrough.

Pickett Charging

The Confederates advanced in an imposing line across a mile of open ground toward a corpse of trees. The Union artillery immediately opened on them, tearing great gaps in the Confederate line. Some batteries had held their fire during the Confederate bombardment, and so had plenty of ammunition to beat back the infantry. Onward the Southerners pressed across the field. In 15 minutes they reached the Emmitsburg Road, and after climbing the fences reformed their line, closed the gaps and moved forward. The Union troops shifted to canister and the infantry opened fire. Many rebels fell, but some still pressed forward. As the officers were hit the organization began to fall apart. The attack began to falter.

Armistead

Brigadier General Lews Armistead, at the head of his brigade, with his sword in hand and his hat upon the top, shouted out, "Come on, boys, give them cold steel! Who will follow me?" Several hundred men rushed with him towards the position called the Bloody Angle. The rebels, with Armistead at their head, rushed in among the Yankees fought hand to hand occurred. They captured and turned around two Union guns, but there was no ammunition to fire them.

Union reinforcements quickly pressed down on the Confederates who had made it over the wall, overcoming the remnants of Garnett's and Armistead's brigades. The Southern officers had fallen, so the men either made their way back to their lines, or were rounded up and captured. 5,600 men had been lost in this charge, 50% of the men engaged. The Union defenders lost only about 1,500. Lee came out to meet his beaten soldiers, telling them the defeat was all his fault. When he ordered Pickett to rally his division to defend against a possible Union counter attack, the young general replied, “General Lee, I have no division.” Lee had believed his men were invincible, and the break down of coordination doomed the unlikely attack.

Gettysburg – Lee's Plan

When the sun set and the battle ended on July 2nd, it was apparent that although the battle plan was based on faulty information and had not been executed until late, it had gained some success. Sickle's line had been broken and reinforcements sent to him had been crushed. But all the attacks ultimately failed for lack of support. There seemed to be opportunities for the next day. Lee thought if an attack on Cemetery Hill was well supported it might be able to follow up on the partial successes gained the previous day and break the Union line. Lee's plan for the third day at Gettysburg would remain unchanged. Lee made the mistake of trying the same thing again, and hoping that a favorable opportunity would allow him to win the battle. He had great confidence in his army, and believed that if they worked together they could not be defeated. Using Pickett's fresh division, Longstreet would again attack the Federal left while Ewell continued his diversion on Meade's right.

Longstreet

On the other side of Cemetery Ridge, Meade was holding a council of war. He asked his Corps commanders whether the army should retreat, hold in its position, or launch an attack. The consensus, as famously stated by Slocum, was that they should "stay and fight it out." The battle would continue on July 3rd.

Union breastworks on Culp's Hill

The battle on Culp's Hill resumed early on the third day. The Federals had surrounded the foothold of Union entrenchments Johnson's division had gained. After an artillery duel Ewell attacked with more troops. There was little room to maneuver, and the fight came down to a deafening and deadly barrage of musketry. So many shots were fired through the men's rifles they became to hot to touch. The rebels pressed hard they were unable to break the Federal lines. Then the Federals counter-attacked and pushed the Confederates down Culp's Hill, recapturing their entrenchments. The renewed Confederate attack on Culp's Hill had been unsuccessful, and it had not even served its purpose as a diversion. No one had told Pickett he was to attack in the morning, and so as the fighting wound down on Culp's Hill the troops were still being prepared to make what would be called Pickett's charge.

Gettysburg – Cemetery Ridge and Culp's Hill

The division to the left of McLaws was that of Major General Richard Anderson of A. P. Hill's Third Corps. He was to attack in support of Longstreet. His line set out with a cheer about 6 pm. Anderson's men were helped in their attack by Barksdale's charge, which struck the Federals they were facing in the flank. The Union division Anderson struck was able to hold together, although it was forced to fall back and give up several cannon. But Anderson's attack stalled. It was getting dark, the air was filled with smoke, and no troops were sent forward to help push forward the attack. But one brigade did gain very noteworthy success. Ambrose Wright reported that he had gained the top of Cemetery Ridge, and held it for some time before behind forced off for lack of reinforcements. This success may have convinced Lee to order Pickett's Charge the next day.

As these attacks were going on along the Confederate right an attack was also being made on the left, against Culp's Hill. It was intended as a diversion to keep Federal forces pinned down. There had been constant skirmishing throughout the day, but the lines did not move forward until it was nearly dark. The Union right was in great peril, as a 1/2 mile of ground was held by only one brigade, the rest having been pulled out to bolster other sections of the line. But unusually for this period of the war, they had built entrenchments and when the division of Edward "Allegheny" Johnston attacked, they were able to make a good defense. The rebels charged forward through the darkness, and halted within 100 yards of the Federals to exchange fire with them. The Confederates gained some success and captured portions of the Federals breastworks, but Union reinforcements were rushed to the area, and the battle ended in the darkness, with the Confederates retaining a portion of the Union works.

Attack on Culp's Hill

Gettysburg – Peach Orchard

While part of McLaw's division were fighting in the Wheatfield, more of his men were fighting at the Peach Orchard. McLaws was to move forward to capture the high ground around the orchard, and then assist Hood in rolling up the Union right. The Federals were along the Emitsburg Road, but did not have enough men to adequately cover that line. Leading McLaw's assault was William Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade, famous for their gallant defense of Fredericksburg. At their head rode Barksdale himself, mounted on a horse with his sword in hand and his long white hair flowing in the wind. As the Mississippians advanced they took hits from Federal artillery fire, but they closed their ranks and rushed towards the Yankee infantry. Having twice their numbers, they were able to smash through the Federal defense. The rest of the Peach Orchard line soon crumbled. But Barksdale's glorious charge eventually stalled. The Mississippians could only advance so far without becoming very disorganized, and Barksdale himself was wounded, hit in the left knee, and then had his foot hit by a cannon ball. A third shot in the chest knocked him from his horse. He was left on the field for dead, and was later captured and died in a Union field hospital.

Barksdale

Sickle's advanced position had turned out into a disaster. Devil's Den was captured, Little Round Top was severally pressed and the Peach Orchard lost. It appeared that his decision might cost the Federal army the battle. During the fighting, an artillery shot hit him the right knee. Strangely enough, the horse he was riding did not spook. He was helped down and his wounded was dressed. Turning over his command over his command to Davis Birney, he was taken to the rear to have his leg amputated. An experienced politician, he insisted on being taken to Washington, and began a public relations campaign to ensure that every one believed that he saved the day for the Union. In this he was successful, not being court marshelled because of his wound and eventually receiving the Medal of Honor for his actions.

Gettysburg - Wheatfield

While Hood's first brigades were fighting for Devil's Den Little Round Top, more troops were fighting over a Wheatfield. Sickles had reinforced his jagged line with troops from Sykes V Corps. Southern troops advanced against the Federal line, and were met with bursts of cannon and musketry. They began to get around the Federal left flank, but as the Union troops began to fall back the Confederates lost their momentum, exhausted from their charge.

Capture of the Wheatfield

With Hood's attack stalled Longstreet ordered McLaws' division forward forward, and some of his troops struck the area of the Wheatfield. The seasoned Confederate veterans were at first driven back but came on again, pressing the Federals back. Meade had brought up a division from Hancock's line, and sent it into the Wheatfield as reinforcements. One of these soldiers, Major Peter Nelson of the 66th New York, wrote the fight:

Very soon we were under fire of musketry, but, nothing daunted, we pressed steadily forward through wheat-fields, woods, over rail fences 10 feet high, stone walls, ditches, deep ravines, rocks, and all sorts of obstructions, every one of which had served as cover for the enemy, and from which a murderous fire was poured upon us as we advanced, but without avail, as nothing could stop the impetuosity of our men, who, without waiting to lead or even fix bayonets, rushed eagerly forward at a run, their cry being constantly, Forward! Charge! ... Arrived at a rocky ridge about 300 yards from where we commenced our victorious advance, we halted, taking the movement from the right, and engaged the enemy at short range. ... By this time, owing to the distance we had advanced in line of battle at a run, and the irregularity of the ground we had advanced over, we were in a deplorable state of confusion; men from every regiment in the division were intermingled with ours in one confused mass. While personally engaged in endeavoring to reform the regiment, and obtain something like order, I perceived the right of the line retiring. On inquiring the cause, I earned that the enemy had turned our right flank; also that all the senior officers of the brigade were either killed or wounded. In accordance with instructions received previous to entering the engagement, to regulate our movement by the right, I gave orders to retire...

As the sun was setting the Confederates were pushing through the Wheat Field after the retreating Federals. It appeared, on this portion of the field at least, that Lee might have won a victory in Pennsylvania.

Confederate in the Wheatfield

Gettysburg - Little Round Top

The attack on the Union left would be made by two divisions from Longstreet, McLaws' on the left and Hood's on the right. At about 4:30 pm, as the guns fell silent from a 30 minute bombardment, Hood, standing in his stirrups at the head of the Texas Brigade, shouted "Fix Bayonets, my brave Texans! Forward, and take those heights!" As Hood's division rushed toward the Round Tops the encountered rough, boulder stone ground in an area called Devil's Den. The division shifted off to the east as united struggled to avoid the obstacle. As the attack was being made the commander was lost, the mounted Hood was struck with a bullet and put out of action, Evander Law taking his place.

Confederate sharpshooter in Devil's Den

The Northern troops put up a fierce resistance around the rocky outcroppings, but they could not hold for long. Confederates began to get on their flank and even in their rear. Finally the Confederates pushed through Devil's Den, capturing three cannon that had defended it. The Confederates continued to push on around Big Round Top and towards Little Round Top. Until very recently the smaller hill had been bare of Federal troops other than a few signal men. Sickles had been instructed to anchor his line there, but had disobeyed the order. Brigadier General Gouverneur Warren, chief engineer of the army, rode to the hill and instantly saw the situation. He recognized that the hill was the key to the whole battlefield. Confederate artillery here could wreck havoc on the Federal lines. Warren quickly rode back and on his own authority sent Colonel Strong Vincent's 1,000 man brigade to occupy the hill, along with a battery of artillery. Vincent arranged his regiments on the hill, and they were soon attacked by troops from Hood's division. Already disorganized from the charge, their lines were broken as they tried to climb the rocky sides of Little Round Top. As they approached the top, they came under fire from Strong's men and were driven back. They came on again and again and a fierce fight developed. Reinforcements arrived for the Federals in the form of the 140th New York, a Zouve regiment with colorful uniforms. Which rushed forward and helped stabilize the Union line.

Hood's Attack

The unit on the far left of the Union position was the 20th Maine, commanded by Colonel Joshua Chamberlin. Today it is one of the most famous unites of the entire Civil War. The Confederates pushed hard against this regiment. Chamberlin remembered counting five separate attacks on his line. His troops were stretched very thin and his men were running low on ammunition. It was thought that the line was about to break, so he ordered a bayonet charge. The 20th Maine rushed down the hill, hit the Confederates and drove them into retreat, capturing a number of retreating rebels.

Through the quick action of Gouverneur Warren, the hard fighting of Vincient's brigade and the disorganization of the Confederates, Little Round Top was held for the Union. The man who got much of the glory for this fight was Joshua Chamberlin, although were other Union units on the hill that fought just as hard against the Confederate attacks.

Gettysburg - Preparations for Attack

Lee's Plan

The commanders of both armies around Gettysburg were up before dawn on the morning of July 2nd. Meade was posting his troops on the hills of south of Gettysburg, preparing to receive the attack he expected. Meanwhile Lee was looking for an opportunity to make that attack. He sent out scouting parties and one, venturing out in the direction of the Union left, reported that he had ridden to Little Round Top and there were no troops in the area. According to this report, there was nothing to stop Lee from moving around the Federal line and hitting them in the flank or even rear. This was just the opportunity he had been looking for, so he began seeing to the preparations for the attack. But in this he did not have the willing cooperation of Longstreet, who would be commanding the assault. Longstreet still wanted to fight a defensive battle. Lee had made it clear it was not going to happen, but his lieutenant was not content to just obey orders. Worse still, Lee's plan was based on faulty information. Somehow the scouting party must have been confused about their location, as Union reports show that there would have been plenty of troops visible in the Little Round Top area at that time.

Sickles examines his lines

The commander on the far Union left, where Lee planned to attack, was Dan Sickles. Sickles was not a military man, but a politician looking to overcome a bad reputation. Sickles was not satisfied with his position on Cemetery Ridge. He was concerned because of some higher ground a little over a half mile in front of him around a peach orchard. He thought that Confederates holding the slight rise would be able to break his line. About noon, without authorization from Meade, he moved his corps forward to cover the higher ground. Writing after the battle, Sickles acknowledged that it was done outside of his orders:

It was not through any misinterpretation of orders. It was either a good line or a bad one, and, whichever it was, I took it on my own responsibility.... I took up that line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take - as they would have taken if I had not occupied it in force - would have rendered our position on the left untenable; and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us. 

Sickles

 But this move jeprodized the Union line. The new position was nearly twice as long, spreading his troops very thin and making them neglect the truly important position of Little Round Top, leaving it free to be captured by the Confederates. When Meade heard of this move, he was very angry. Without waiting a moment he gave orders that the stituation be corrected. But it was too late. For as he rode up to Sickles position, he discovered that the Confederates were massing for an attack.

Sickles