Battle of Ringgold Gap

After the Confederates were defeated at Chattanooga, Bragg retreated south towards Atlanta. When the army passed Ringgold Gap, he ordered Cleburne to hold it to the last ditch so the rest of the army could escape. Although it was considered to be a suicide assignment, Cleburne and his men did it gloriously. On November 27^th, 150 years ago today, they held the gap successfully, giving Hooker there the same reception they gave Sherman on Missionary Ridge. Covering the hill with slain, they effectively stopped the pursuit in its tracks. Hooker lost around 509 men, Cleburne 221.

Cleburne

Bragg halted his discouraged men, and as he had after the battle of Murfreesboro, offered to turn over his command. This time this offer was accepted. In his time as commander of the Army of Tennessee, Bragg had fought four battles, and although three could be claimed as victories, in two of those cases he followed his claimed victory with a retreat. Although he had penetrated deep into Kentucky, his mistakes had led him into a disastrous retreat from an almost impregnable position. Jefferson Davis would eventually decide to replace him with Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston had shown on several occasions that he was very hesitant to fight, but the president could find no better man for the job. 

Battle of Chattanooga

Tunnel Hill
150 years ago today, the Federals executed their attack on the Confederates at Chattanooga. Hooker was to continue to press on the Confederate right, Sherman on the left, and Thomas in the center. Sherman was at a positioned called Tunnel Hill. His 16,600 men were met at first by only 4,000 under Patrick Cleburne, who barely made it back to the battle in time. Cleburne's brave men were entrenched on Tunnel Hill which took its name from the railroad tunnel which cut through it. Sherman had chosen the strongest position on the Confederate line to attack. At dawn he sent two brigades forward under Brigadier General John Corse. They were stopped hard by Cleburne's men. The Confederates could throw stones down from their position and do almost as much damage as the bullets they shot. Corse's men could make no headway and were forced back. Sherman sent more lines forward, dashing them against Cleburne's line. One Federal wrote,

We had been concealed from the enemy all the forenoon by the edge of a wood; yet his constant shelling of this wood showed that he knew we were there. As the column came out upon the open ground, and in sight of the rebel batteries, their renewed and concentrated fire knocked the limbs from the trees about out heads. An awful cannonade had opened on us. ... I had heard the roaring of heavy battle before, but never such a shrieking of cannon-balls and bursting of shells as met us on that run. We could see the rebels working their guns, while in plain view other batteries galloped up, unlimbered and let loose upon us. ... In ten minutes the field was crossed, the foot of the ascent was reached, and now the Confederates poured into our faces the reserved fire of their awful musketry. It helped little that we returned it from our own rifles, hidden as the enemy were in rifle pits, behind logs, and stumps, and trees. ... Then someone cried, 'Look to the tunnel!' There, on the right, pouring through a tunnel in the mountain, and out of the railway cut, came the graycoats by hundreds, flanking us completely. ... They were through by the hundreds, and a fatal enfilading fire was cutting our line to pieces.

Sherman continued attacking for six hours, never breaking through the rebel line. When the Federals gained any foothold, Cleburne shifted his troops and launched a strong counterattack, himself at the head of his men. Charging down the hill they broke the Federal lines. By late in the afternoon, Sherman's attacks had accomplished nothing. He had lost almost 2,000 men, while Cleburne had skillfully held his position, loosing only about 200. One Confederate who visited the battlefield wrote,

They had swept their front clean of Yankies, indeed, when I went up about sundown the side of the ridge in their front was strewn with dead yankies & looked like a lot of boys had been sliding down the hill side, for when a line of the enemy would be repulsed, they would start down hill & soon the whole line would be rolling down like a ball, it was so steep a hill side there.

Grant watching the battle

Missionary Ridge
Not all of the Confederate line had put up such a good fight as Cleburne. The odds in the center of the Confederate line were much better for the Confederates. While Cleburne had only one division to fight six, here Bragg had four to Thomas's five. In the center, Grant ordered Thomas to go forward at 3:30 pm after it was clear Sherman was making no headway. Ten minutes after the order was given, six cannon rang out, the signal for the 25,000 Federals to move forward towards the Confederate gun pits. Bragg had 112 cannon on the 400 foot ridge, and they opened at once on the advancing Northerners. The cannon balls tore into the Federal lines, but they were not halted. They broke into a run towards the ridge, with yells of "Chickamauga! Chickamauga!", remembering their defeat of a few weeks before. They rushed forward and captured the line of rifle pits. The second Confederate line in the middle of the ridge opened a heavy fire upon the intruders. At first the men were pinned down, but instead of fleeing, the men began to move slowly up the slope. They had no orders to advance, they moved of their own accord. They wanted to come to grips with the enemy rather than lay there and be shot. One Yankee wrote:

Above, the summit of the hill was one sheet of flame and smoke, and the awful explosions of artillery and musketry made the earth fairly tremble. Below, the columns of dark blue, with the old banner of beauty and of glory leading them on, were mounting up with leaning forms.... Cannon shot tore through their ranks; musket balls were rapidly and tearfully decimating them; behind them, the dead and wounded lay thick as autumn leaves.... With a wild cheer and a madder rush our men dashed forward, and for a few moments a sharp, desperate, almost hand-to-hand fight with bayonet and ball ensued. Before this resistless assault the rebel line was lifted as by a whirlwind, and borne backward, shattered, bleeding and confused.

The strong position was not taken just because of the bravery of the Federal troops, there were problems with the position itself. Although it was strong naturally, that strength made the defenders careless. The order for the first line to fall back after a few volleys had not been communicated to all the troops, so there was confusion and demoralization. The engineers had also made a bad mistake, placing the top line of rifle pits on the geographical crest rather than the military crest. On Missionary Ridge the defenders had blind spots, since they were on the actual crest. When the Federals came up the hill, not stopped by the Confederate volleys, the men broke and ran for the rear. The officers tried to stem the rout, but it was of no use. Bragg himself tried to rally them, but they ignored him. “Grey clad men rushed wildly down the hill and into the woods,” a Yankee wrote, “tossing away knapsacks, muskets and blankets as they ran. Batteries galloped back along the narrow, winding roads with reckless speed, and officers, frantic with rage, rushed from one panic-stricken group to another, shouting and cursing as they strove to check the headlong flight, but all in vain.”

37 cannon and 3000 men were captured, and Bragg himself barely made his escape. The Confederate center was completely wrecked. the Federals had suffered heavily as well. Sheridan alone, who had delivered the heaviest assault, had lost 1,346 of his 6500 men. Some regiments had over half their men killed or wounded. They halted for a time at the top of the ridge, resting on their gains. The Confederates on the left and right of the line tried to contain the breakthrough as much as possible, fighting the Federals from both directions. Cleburne's men held their ground until after sunset, and they retreated last, the unbroken rear guard of Bragg's army.

Missionary Ridge

During the course of this several day battle for Chattanooga, Bragg had lost 361 killed, 2160 wounded and 4146 captured, while Grant had 753 killed, 4722 wounded and 349 captured. But more importantly, Confederate control of Chattanooga, the gateway to the South, had been lost. Many mistakes had been made which caused Bragg to lose his very strong position. He had bad relations with many of his subordinates, causing some very talented men to have to be removed from his command so that the army could continue to function. Longstreet had been sent to East Tennessee, weakening the force. The entrenchments on Missionary Ridge had been badly positioned, and orders to the men had been confused. By this time, most of the Confederates were veterans. They knew when to stand and fight and when to run. When they thought they had no chance of success, they ran, with the exception of Cleburne's men on the right.

Battle of Lookout Mountain

Lookout Mountain

According to the Union plan for the Battle of Chattanooga, Joseph E. Hooker attacked the Confederate positions on Lookout Mountain 150 years ago today. Lookout Mountain is a 1,800 foot height rising above Chattanooga and the Tennessee River. The overall commander of the mountain was Brigadier General Carter Stevenson, a West Pointer and career military officer from Virginia. He placed his own brigade on the very summit, with three others on a bench below. Altogether, he had about 8,700 men. Although the mountain looks easy to defend, it actually was more difficult than it appeared. The bench was commanded by Union artillery, and the Federals outnumbered the Southern defenders with their force of 12,000 men. On September 24th, the mountain was wreathed in mist, causing the battle that day to be called romantically, though technically incorrectly, the Battle Above the Clouds.

Hooker's men were supposed to march at dawn, but they were delayed until 8:30 am. As they marched forward, they were covered by 13 Union batteries firing on the Confederate positions. The Federal forces encountered Confederate skirmishers at 9:30 and pushed them back with their superior forces. The Confederates had been told to fall back fighting, as they did not have the strength for a full defense. Stevenson's artillery on the summit of the mountain opened fire, and as the Union advanced close the gunners had to depress their weapons more and more. Finally, the Yankees reached a point where the guns could not be pointed downward any further, making the artillery on the summit useless. Lookout Mountain was too steep for an easy defense, since the cannon could not sweep the entire approach. But the rough ground made the advance hard for the Federal troops. A Union officer wrote of the battle:

[S]lowly yet steadily the assailing lines of battle swept up the rugged mountain, driving before them the enemy's heavy line of skirmishers, which gradually fell back upon the main line of battle.... At this moment the prospect, which to the spectator upon the fortified ridge directly opposite, and where the batteries were stationed, had been one of the most grand and imposing that can be conceived, was suddenly obscured. A dense cloud enveloped the side of the mountain, and though the summit was in full view above the cloud, the furiously contending forces upon the Northern slope were entirely hidden. The incessant clatter and rattle of musketry still continued, but on one, save those in the very midst of the deadly conflict, could declare how it was going, or who would prove triumphant.

Around the Cravens House, a Confederate regiment beat off one attack, but with the next, they were swamped and routed. Stevenson ordered two more brigades to join the original one in attempting to resist the Union drive, but it was of no use. They tried to form a line, but the Federals got around their flank in the mist and the rebels had to retreat. Finally, near sunset, Hooker ordered his men to halt. Although at points he thought he was about to be defeated, his men had captured half of the mountain after a hard fight through the woods, boulders and mist. He intended to continue the fight the next day. But the next day there would be no battle here. Bragg had ordered Stevenson to abandon the mountain which he did through the afternoon and night. Bragg pulled back the left of his army to focus on the defense of Missionary Ridge. This battle had cost Hooker 629 men, the Confederate defenders 1,251, over 1000 of which were captured.

Battle of Orchard Knob

Tennessee River

After the battle of Chickamauga, the Confederate army under Braxton Bragg pursued the Federals to Chattanooga, where a siege began. Ulysses Grant and reinforcements arrived in the town, and the Federals were able to reopen their supply line. Bragg divided his army, sending Longstreet to fight Bragg in east Tennessee. In the mean time, the Federal forces increased. Sherman's forces began arriving on November 20th.

Grant

Grant planned to use Sherman's and Hooker's men to attack Bragg, positioned on the heights around the town. Grant thought that Thomas's troops, who had been defeated at Chickamauga, would not be able to fight. On November 23rd, 150 years ago today, Grant got word that Bragg was abandoning his position. This was not true, he was just sending more men to East Tennessee. By this time, because of the Union reinforcement and the division of the Confederate army, Grant had 76,000 men available to fight, while Bragg had only 43,000.

Grant did not want the Confederates to escape, so he ordered Thomas to attack Orchard Knob, a small rise in front of the main Confederate position on Missionary Ridge. This movement was intended to be a reconnaissance in force to determine the strength of the enemy. At 1:30 pm almost 15,000 Federals moved out in long lines across the fields. They were moving on only 600 Confederates, who fired only one volley before making a hasty retreat.

Orchard Knob

This movement showed Bragg the Federal's intentions, and he recalled the troops he had just sent to Longstreet. Cleburne's division returned in time to participate in the battle, and they would do very good service. The Confederates had neglected to fortify Missionary Ridge during all the weeks of the siege, but the orders were finally given and that work began. But these new entrenchments were constructed with a fatal flaw. They were built on the very top of the ridge, rather than a little below it, on what is called the military crest. This meant that they would not be able see the Yankees for much of their climb up the hill.

Orchard Knob

The Union decided to continue their attack on Bragg, and the generals reworked their plans. The right would attack the Confederate positions on Lookout Mountain, Thomas would continue to press the center at Missionary Ridge, and Sherman would cross the Tennessee River to attack the top of Missionary Ridge on the left.

Siege of Chattanooga - Battle of Wauhatchie Station

When Grant arrived in Chattanooga to take command of the army under siege by Bragg's Confederates, he was told of a plan that had been devised by the army's chief engineer William “Baldy” Smith, to get supplies into the town. He liked it, and ordered that it be put into execution. It was called the Cracker Line. The plan was for supplies to be brought to Kelley's Ferry on the Tennessee, then overland through Cummings Gap in Raccoon Mountain, cross the river again at Brown's Ferry, then brought across the river directly into the city.

To use this line however Bragg's men would have to be driven across Raccoon Mountain. Grant planned to have Hooker move under cover of darkness to meet up with two columns of troops from Thomas, one of which would silently float pass Lookout Mountain while the other would march overland as reinforcements. He ordered that it be put into execution early on the morning of October 27th. The men from Thomas were successful in passing Lookout Mountain without being sighted. They set up a Pontoon bridge and captured Brown's Ferry with little resistance, as few Confederate units had been stationed in the area. The next day Hooker arrived, and the Cracker line was secured right under Bragg's noose. It was put into operation, and know there was no trouble getting men or supplies into Chattanooga.

The Confederates were upset that the siege had been lifted, and immediately began trying to cut the Cracker Line. Longstreet decided to strike at Wauhatchie Station, where John Greary's division was in a weaker position than the rest of Hocker's men. Longstreet ordered a night attack to be made, and it went into effect early on the morning of October 29, 150 years ago today. The strike was scheduled for 10 pm, but the darkness delayed the march for two hours. Greary's men were surprised, and were driven back into a V shaped position anchored on the river. Two Union corps were sent to his aid, and the Confederates fell back in co fusion. The battle had been badly planned on both sides, and the confusion of a night attack destroyed the Confederate chances for victory.

Siege of Chattanooga

After defeating Rosecrans's Union army at the Battle of Chickamauga, Bragg's Confederates received intelligence that their foes were in full retreat, but they did not mount an aggressive pursuit. Bragg did not want to leave the railroad, which was serving as his supply line. The cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forest moved to within three miles of Chattanooga, where the Federals had positioned themselves. The placed could have been easily captured, but Bragg would not move. The fruits of victory were lost by the Confederate failure to advance. Their victory was rendered almost useless.

By the time they arrived on the hills surrounding Chattanooga, the Federals were prepared for a long defense. By September 23rd the Confederates occupied Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and a siege of Chattanooga began. James Longstreet, commanding a corps from Lee temporarily detached to help Bragg, wished to attempt a flanking movement, but Bragg refused. He preferred just to wait and starve out Rosecrans, as he had received word that the Yankees only had six days provisions. He extended the Confederate lines to Raccoon Mountain, and placed artillery to cover the roads that ran along the edge of the Tennessee River. Thus blocking the easiest access to the town, he forced the Federals to carry what supplies they could bring across sixty miles of muddy roads.

Rosecrans

When Lincoln got news of Rosecrans's disaster, he decided to reinforce him without delay. Hooker's Corps from Virginia was rushed west by railroad, and Ulysees S. Grant, who had been given command of all the forces from the Allegheny Mountains to the Mississippi, was ordered to march to Chattanooga with 20,000 men. Although when the siege began Bragg had more men, his decision not to assault meant that after a few days Hooker arrived. With these new men the Union garrison outnumbered the Confederate besiegers.

Chattanooga from Lookout Mountain

The Union high command was not impressed with Rosecrans's performance after his defeat at Chickamauga. Charles Dana, assistant secretary of war reported on Rosecrans

I have never seen a public man possessing talent with less administrative power, less clearness and steadiness in difficulty, and greater practical incapacity than General Rosecrans. ... Under the present circumstances I consider this army to be very unsafe in his hands.

Grant eventually decided to replace Rosecrans with George Thomas, the new Federal hero who had held the field at Chickamauga after Rosecrans and most of the army had fled.

The Gettysburg Campaign

Due to other projects, in the past two weeks this blog has not been updated as often as usual. But since we are right up on the Battle of Gettysburg, here's a post to bring you up to speed on the campaign.

After deciding to invade the north, Lee moved his army up the Shenandoah Valley, using the mountains as a shield against prying Union scouts. On June 14th and 15th the Confederate 2nd corps under Richard Ewell defeated an army under Robert Milroy, capturing thousands of prisoners and opening the pathway to Maryland.

Joseph Hooker, commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, was in a very difficult position. He could get no intelligence of Lee's movements, as his cavalry could not penetrate JEB Stuart's shield guarding the Confederate movements. Hooker wanted a make a strike towards Richmond, since it was being left less protected, but Lincoln however would have none of it. He told Hooker that his objective was to destroy Lee's army and he had to follow him north. Hooker did not begin a serious pursuit until June 25th when he got news that Lee had crossed the Potomac. Meantime, his relations with his superiors was deteriorating. He quarreled with Henry Halleck over whether Harper's Ferry should be defended. When his orders were countermanded, he resigned command of the army. A message for George Meade arrived early on the morning of June 28th ordering him to take command of the army. When Meade was woken by the messengers, he at first thought that he was being arrested. But none the less he took command and tried to acquaint himself with the position of his and Lee's forces as quickly as possible.

Meade

As the Union army was in the midst of changing commanders, Lee's rebels were advancing into Pennsylvania. As he was advancing north into the enemy's country Lee issued orders to try to ensure the Yankee civilians were treated well:

The commanding general has observed with marked satisfaction the conduct of the troops on the march, and confidently anticipates results commensurate with the high spirit they have manifested. No troops could have displayed greater fortitude or better performed the arduous marches of the past ten days. Their conduct in other respects has with few exceptions been in keeping with their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise. There have however been instances of forgetfulness on the part of some, that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties expected of us by civilization and Christianity are not less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own. ...It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemies, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain. The commanding general therefore earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain with most scrupulous care from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property, and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against the orders on this subject.

These orders did not mean that the people of the north approved of the treatment they received. A major part of Lee's goals for the invasion was to procure supplies for his army, and they had to come from somewhere. Ewell was sent out ahead with his corps to collect supplies. He would requisition supplies and money from each town along the way. In this he was successful, collecting in two weeks 6,700 barrels of flour, 5,200 cattle, 1,000 hogs and 51,000 pounds of meat.

Stuart

Back in Virginia, important decisions had been made which would rob the army of his cavalry for the coming campaign. Stuart, smarting under his surprise at Brandy Station, wished to redeem himself with another ride around the Union army. His orders were to leave half his cavalry to guard the mountain passes, while taking the rest and joining Ewell on his right flank. Lee wrote the orders so that Stuart would have the discretion to ride around the Federal army as long as he was not delayed in his mission of protecting the army. The three brigades that Stuart took with him were his best men, and he left those of lesser quality with Lee. His ride to join Lee took longer than he expected. He did not cross the Potomac until June 28th. He cut the Army of the Potomac's communication with Washington for several hours and captured a wagon train.

Lee expected to hear news from Stuart on June 27th or 28th. However, Stuart's couriers were unable to get through to Lee. The absence of Stuart left Lee without his eyes and ears. Although Lee still did have half the army's cavalry, about 2,700 troopers, he did not use them effectively. Lee gave them few orders, and they were not proactive in anticipating his wishes to gather intelligence as Stuart would have been. They did not arrive with the main army until the battle was underway. This lack of cavalry left Lee blindfolded as he moved through foreign territory.

Lee

Meade, on the other hand, had very good intelligence. There were many friendly civilians that sent him reliable information. Meade planned to cover Washington and Baltimore. He was naturally cautious, but knew the need for boldness to catch Lee. He wrote to his wife on June 29:

We are marching as fast as we can to relieve Harrisburg, but have to keep a sharp lookout that the rebels don't turn around us and get at Washington and Baltimore in our rear. They have a cavalry force in our rear, destroying railroads, etc., with the view of getting me turn back; but I shall not do it. I am going straight at them, and will settle this thing one way or the other. The men are in good spirits; and we have been reinforced so as to have equal numbers with the enemy, and with God's blessing I hope to be successful.

Meade had three corps advancing towards Lee under John F. Reynolds, one of his most respected commanders. Behind were two more in a second line, and two out to cover the eastern flank. At the very front of the army were two brigades of cavalry under John Buford to guard the army and gather intelligence. All together Meade had over 112,000 men. He thought Lee had 100,000, but the real number was a bit lower than that. Meade's plan was to fight defensively on ground of his choosing, although he was not opposed to launching an attack if he saw a good opportunity. In accordance with this plan he issued on June 30th what was later called the Pipe Creek Circular, ordering the army to take up a position along Pipe Creek in Maryland. His engineers told him this would be a good defensive position, and it would cover the approaches to Baltimore and Washington. This order was not set out until the morning of July 1st, but before then events were unfolding that would make the Pipe Creek order unnecessary.

Because of his lack of information from cavalry scouts, Lee knew little of the Federals movements until the night of June 28th when a spy working for Longstreet reported. He said he had gone to Washington and knew that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the river and was moving northward. Lee had no choice but to act on this information. The spy was said to be reliable, and he could not ignore a threat to his rear. Therefore he ordered Ewell to abandon his advance on Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which he was about to capture, and concentrate to the south with Longstreet and Hill to met this new threat from Meade.

As the army was concentrating on June 30th, a brigade of Hill's corps advanced towards the small town of Gettysburg to gather supplies, and there encountered Union cavalry. The Confederates fell back without engaging them. Lee had given orders that none of his commanders were to start a general engagement since the army was not yet concentrated. But A. P. Hill and Henry Heth, the division commander, did not think that there were significant Union forces in Gettysburg. Therefore Hill authorized Heth to continue on a reconnaissance in force to Gettysburg the next day, July 1.

Battle of Franklin's Crossing

Robert E. Lee's withdraw from the Fredericksburg on June 3^rd had been observed and reported to Joe Hooker, the Federal commander. Hooker ordered John Sedgwick to advance with his VI Corps and verify these reports. If Lee had indeed abandoned his lines, Hooker would have to move to maintain contact.

John Sedgwick

Sedgwick's men advanced on the morning of the 5^th, 150 years ago today. They encountered Confederate skirmishers from A. P. Hill's Third Corps, which Lee had left behind to foil Union attempts at pursuit. These rebel skirmishers were able to beat back Federal attempts to cross the Rappahannock River at Deep Run. The Union brought up artillery, but its fire still could not drive off the Confederates.

Finally the 26^th New Jersey and 5^th Vermont loaded into pontoon boats to cross the river. They were able to rush across the river and land on the opposite shore. Charging forward, they captured the rifle pits and 35 prisoners. They pushed forward, and encountered more, and stronger, rebel detachments. A fierce skirmish developed, and finally the Confederates were able to drive the Union troops back across the river. The Confederates lost 6 killed in addition to the 35 captured. The Federals lost over 50 men.

Hill

The next day Hill fell back to follow in Lee's tracks. But this small skirmish had convinced Sedgwick and Hooker that Lee was still in his Fredericksburg lines in full force. It would be several more days until another reconnaissance party was sent forward that discovered the truth.

Hooker Retreats from Chancellorsville

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End of the Chancellorsville campaign

With Sedgwick back across the river, Lee got his section of the army moving to try to resume the offensive on Hooker's main body. The night before Hooker had called a meeting of his corps commanders to consider what should be done. He stated the situation and his responsibility to guard Washington, DC. It was obvious to everyone that Hooker favored a retreat. Nevertheless  he left the generals along to discuss the situation among themselves. After a time they voted, with Meade, Reynolds and Howard for a resumption of the attack, and Sickles and Couch against it. Even though a majority of his subordinates disagreed with him, Hooker declared that he would order a retreat across the river. John Reynolds complained "What was the use of calling us together at this time of night when he intended to retreat anyhow?" The next day Hooker crossed the river, followed by his army. By the next morning the retreat had been complete. Lee had been poised to attack Federals, who were in strong entrenchments. It may have turned the campaign around, but Hooker didn't want to take the risk.

Hooker

Lee had been victorious. Although the ultimate victory had slipped from his grasp, he had, when surrounded by two forces twice his numbers, converged on one, switched corps commanders in the middle of the fighting, pushed Hooker against the river, drove back Sedgwick, and finally convinced Hooker to retreat as well. This victory was gained not only through the brilliance of the Confederate army, but the many mistakes of the Federals. The man who made the most mistakes was Joe Hooker. During the beginning of the campaign he had advanced and talked boldly, but then he faltered. He would not press the advance, instead retreating until he was eventually across the river. Some blamed it on drunkenness, or from withdrawal from alcohol, others on an injury from his close call with a shell. Publicly he blamed the defeat on anyone he could, but privately he acknowledged the source of the defeat, saying according to one source, "It was not hurt by a shell, and I was not drunk. For once I lost confidence in Joe Hooker, and that is all there is to it."

Confederate dead from 2nd Fredericksburg

In the battle of Chancellorsville the North lost 1,606 killed, 9,672 wounded and 5,919 missing. The Confederates 1,665 killed, 9,081 wounded and 2,018 missing. The fighting had been very heavy. On May 3 alone over 20,000 men had been lost. It was the bloodiest day of the Civil War second only to Antietam.

Battle of Salem Church

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Battle of Salem Church

In the battles of the last three days, Lee had beaten back Hooker, but he was still in a dangerous position. Sedgwick on his flank, advancing from Fredericksburg. 150 years ago today he would adopt another daring plan. While Stuart kept Hooker's men contained with Jackson's old Second Corps, Lee, with the contingent of the First Corps present, would deal with Sedgwick. Confederate General Jubal Early was able to reoccupy Marye's Heights at 7:00 am. Sedgwick was forced back into a horseshoe position with both flanks on the river, very much like Hooker's position to the west. He had received no aid or orders from Hooker, other than an authorization to fall back across the river if he thought it necessary.

Union troops in a tench at Fredericksburg

Lee pushed Sedgwick throughout the day, but the attacks were disorganized, and were unsuccessful in breaking the Union line. Fighting raged around Salem Church. Many bullets struck the church, and their marks can still be seen to this day. Lee ordered a night attack be made, but it was morning before they were able to reach the Union lines. They found Sedgwick's trenches empty. With Hooker's permission he had retreated across Bank's Ford during the night.

Battle of Chancellorsville – Day 3

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Wounded Union soldiers

Although Howard's XI Corps of the Union army had been destroyed on May 2, Hooker still had many more men than Lee for the fighting the next day. He also had the better position, with Sickles holding the high ground at Hazel Grove that separated Stuart and Lee. From there his line curved back like a horseshoe, with each side anchored on a river, the right on the Rapidan and the left on the Rappohannock. There would be no more flanking today.

But Hooker did not recognize the importance of the position he held. He ordered Sickles to abandon Hazel Grove and fall back to the Plank Road. Sickles protested, but Hooker believed that it had to be done to simply the defense. Once Sickles fell back, the Confederates occupied Hazel Grove. It proved not only an opportunity to reunite the Confederate army, but also the key to the entire battlefield. Confederate artillery commander Col. E. Porter Alexander had spotted the site during the night and was ready to occupy it as soon as Sickles fell back. Over the winter Alexander had reorganized the Confederate artillery into battalions, and this centralized system allowed guns to be brought up quickly to man the valuable position. The Confederate cannons placed at Hazel Grove soon opened on the Union artillery position at Fairview, 1200 yards distant. 30 cannons converged with 54 elsewhere on the line, creating a very destructive fire. Some have called it the Army of Northern Virginia's best artillery position in the war, and Hooker had given it up without a fight.

Confederates attack Hazel Grove

With the powerful support of this artillery Stuart began his attack. His three divisions pushed in three lines through the woods, along side the field running between Fairview and Hazel Grove. He had abandoned the idea of cutting the Federals off from the river fords, as Meade's corps had been positioned to block the way. The first two divisions, those of Heth and Colston, met hard resistance by the Federal troops. J.E.B. Stuart rode along his lines, encouraging the men. As usual, he was in very showy apparel, wearing a brand new uniform, cape and plumed hat. He looked the ideal caviler. As he rode he sang a favorite song:

Ol' Joe Hooker, won't you come out of The Wilderness? Come out of The Wilderness, come out of The Wilderness? Ol' Joe Hooker, won't you come out of The Wilderness? Bully boys, hey! Bully boys, ho!

Finally the Federal lines broke under a charge by the last division, that of Rhodes, combined with the effects of the tremendous bombardment. The victorious Confederates plunged forward with shouts of "Remember Jackson!"


It was at this moment, in the height of the battle, that the most important casualty of that day of fighting occurred – Joe Hooker himself. The Chancellor house, for which the battle would be named, was being used as Hooker's headquarters as well as a field hospital. The Confederate artillery pieces began throwing their shells into the area to disrupt Union communications and supplies. Just after 9:00 Hooker was standing on the porch of a house when a solid Confederate cannonball struck the pillar on which he was leaning, knocking him to the ground and throwing splinters everywhere. His staff put him down on a blanket and gave him some brandy. Eventually he felt well enough to stand up. Just as he did that another ball flew into the area and struck the blanket on which he had just been lying, demonstrating that this was no place for the commander of the army. Riding off, Hooker soon sent a message to summon Darius Courch. He turned over the command, as he had been badly shaken by the shock. Hooker said, "Couch, I turn the command of the army over to you. You will withdraw it and place it in the position designated on this map."

But even as he turned over the command, he gave Couch orders which Couch disagreed with. The army's new commander wanted to try to continue to hold the ground they still had. But Hooker had made up his mind to abandon the field, and there was little anyone else could do about it.

Lee cheered by his men

As the advancing Confederates reached the Chancellor House, the two corps of the army were reunited. One Confederate staff officer remembered the moment:

The scene can never be effaced from the minds of those that witnessed it. The troops were pressing forward with all the ardor and enthusiasm of combat. The white smoke of musketry fringed the front of battle, while the artillery on the hills in rear shook the earth with its thunder and filled the air with the wild shrieking of the shells that plunged into the masses of the retreating foe. To add greater horror and sublimity to the scene, the Chancellorsville House and the woods surrounding it were wrapped in flames. It was then that General Lee rode to the front of his advancing battalions. His presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable bursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who has not witnessed them. The fierce soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle, the wounded crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring flames, all seemed possessed with a common impulse. One long unbroken cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought, rose high above the roar of battle and hailed the presence of a victorious chief. He sat in the full realization of all that soldiers dream of—triumph; and as I looked at him in the complete fruition of the success which his genius, courage, and confidence in his army had won, I thought that it must have been from some such scene that men in ancient days ascended to the dignity of gods.

The Southerners continued to press forward, routing the in some places and almost catching Howard's XI Corps in the flank as they had done the day before.

Sedgwick breaks through on May 3rd

A great victory had been won. The only thing preventing Lee from following up on it was news from Fredericksburg. Early had been left to watch the large Union force there under Sedgwick. This morning Sedgwick had advanced. Early had beaten back two attacks on Marye's Heights had been done at Fredericksburg in December, but a truce was called to remove casualties and the Federals saw how empty the Confederate position was. A third attack was launched and this one was successful. Early, obeying orders, retreated as slowly as possible. Lee had to delay a further attack on Hooker to shift troops to meet this threat.

Skeletons in the woods at Chancellorsville 

Battle of Chancellorsville – May 2, Jackson's Wounding

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Jackson Wounded

Riding past the Confederate line, Jackson, A. P. Hill and their staffs heard Federals up ahead around Fairview and Chancellorsville cutting down trees for breastworks. After he listened to the sounds for a time, Jackson turned around to ride back to the safety of the southern lines. But then a volley of musketry crashed from the Confederate lines through the dark woods. Seeing the horsemen ahead and thinking they were from a Pennsylvania cavalry regiment that had just been sighted, a jumpy Confederate officer had ordered his men to open fire. Many bullets hit their marks. The road was filled with dying horses and men. Hill yelled out to the men to cease fire, as they were friends. "Who gave that order?" the Confederate officer shouted, "It's a lie! Pour it into them, boys!"

The Plank Road, near where Jackson was shot

The Confederate soldiers reloaded and fired again, and the Confederate officers continued to fall. Stonewall Jackson was hit with three of the smoothbore bullets, two in the left arm and a third in his right palm. His horse, spooked by the noise, took off through the woods, and branches ripped across the general's face. Surviving staff officers were able to catch the horse and help Jackson to the ground. Putting him on a litter, they began to carry him towards the main road.

But now the Union artillery near Fairview, hearing the confused noise between the lines, opened fire, filling the air with bursting shells. Jackson's litter bearers came under this fire, and they dropped the wounded man several times. Finally they were able to make it to a field hospital near the rear, and Hunter McGuire, Jackson's staff doctor arrived to care for him.

A. P. Hill

Jackson's wounding created a command crisis in the Army of Northern Virginia. His corps could not be taken over by A. P. Hill as Hill had been wounded in the same volleys, hit in both legs. There were no other veteran commanders on the Second Corps that Hill could trust to take over, so he turned over the command to J.E.B. Stuart. Stuart war was a cavalry officer and he had never commanded any number of infantry, let alone an entire corp of them. But as a natural leader of men, he adapted very quickly to the role. Even with his skill, the night attack Jackson planned was out of the question. Stuart worked through the night to acquaint himself with the situation and commanders with whom he had never worked in this setting. Lee wrote to him at 3:00 in the morning of May 3rd regarding the battle plan for that day:

It is necessary that the glorious victory thus far achieved be prosecuted with the utmost vigor, and the enemy given no time to rally. As soon, therefore, as it is possible, they must be pressed so that we can unite the two wings of the army. Endeavor, therefore, to dispossess them of Chancellorsville, which will permit the union of the whole army. I shall myself proceed to join you as soon as I can make arrangements on this side, but let nothing delay the completion of the plan of driving the enemy from his rear and from his position.

Battle of Chancellorsville – May 2, Jackson's Attack

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By 5 pm, the Confederates were finally ready to attack. Soon Jackson gave the order, and the grey line surged forward through the woods, across the fields, onto the completely unsuspecting Federals. Ahead of the thousands of advancing Confederates came a wave of animals, frightened from the woods by the advancing Confederates. On after them came the rebels, screaming the terrifying rebel yell.

The surprised Federals broke at once. But as the Confederates swept through the camps pockets of resistance began to form. Union officers urged their men to stand with their personal examples. Howard himself grabbed a flag in his one remaining arm and stood on a stump waving it to rally his men. But the Yankee troops that stood and fought were not able to make a cohesive resistance, and they were soon overwhelmed. Most of Howard's force turned into a mob, desperate for survival. Jackson was at the front of the pursuit, urging the men on. By nightfall Jackson's corp had driven Howard's XI corps over a mile, inflicting 2,500 casualties, about 1/4 of Howard's men. Some of Jackson's men could even see the Union headquarters at the Chancellor house. However, the Confederates were disorganized from their rapid advance and a further advance in their present condition was out of the question.

Union retreat

Jackson planned to get his troops moving again and make a night attack. Under the light of a full moon he would strike the Federals while they were disorganized, driving further into Hooker's rear. He planned to get between Hooker and the United States Ford to cut off his retreat. This would leave Hooker surrounded, ready to be crushed by Jackson and Lee. To make this attack he had four brigades of A. P. Hill as a reserve. After ordering A. P. Hill to advance, Jackson went forward with A. P. Hill and their staffs to investigate the Union position. But that ride brought one of the greatest disasters of the war for the Confederate arms.  

Battle of Chancellorsville – May 2, Jackson's March

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Throughout the day on May 2, 150 years go today, Jackson's corps pressed along on their move around Hooker's right flank. Jackson's march had begun much later in the morning than had been intended. The roads were good and the march progressed quickly. Jackson rode along the column, urging his men to hurry saying "Press forward, press forward." They did not go entirely unnoticed. Most of the Union cavalry was far away on a raid, but the Confederate column was sighted by infantry pickets. Some reports made it all the way to Hooker's headquarters at the Chancellor House, but the army commander did not act on the information. He was convinced that Lee was moving across his front in a retreat. It didn't even occur to him that the Confederates could be so bold as to attack.

Howard

The force Jackson was positioning to strike was the XI Corps of Oliver O. Howard. Howard was from Maine and had attended West Point. While in the army he was converted, and considered resigning from the army to become a minster. However he remained and during the Civil War was known as the Christian General. The corps he commanded may have been the worst in the Union army. Most of them were German immigrants, many of them unable to speak English. They disliked Howard because he had replaced their hero, Franz Sigel. By placing these poor quality troops here with their flank in the air, Hooker had shown little concern for his right flank. Howard told Hooker he was prepared for an attack on his right. These preparations consisted of only two cannon and two regiments of infantry guarding the turnpike. He thought the woods were too thick to permit an attack. On his left there was a half mile gap in the Union line where a brigade had been pulled out and not replaced. Howard had been receiving messages of a large Confederate force in his front, but, like Hooker, he ignored them. The Union high command thought they knew the Confederate strategy, but it wouldn't be long before they found out how wrong they were.

Fitzhugh Lee

As Jackson's troops approached their destination, Fitzhugh Lee of the cavalry was out in front scouting. He later wrote,

Upon reaching the Plank road ... my command was halted and ... I made a personal reconnaissance to locate the Federal right for Jackson's attack. With one staff officer I rode across and beyond the plank road .... Seeing a wooded hill in the distance, UI determined, if possible, to get upon its top, as it promised a view of the adjacent country. Cautiously I ascended its side, reaching the open spot upon its summit without molestation. What a sight presented itself before me. Below me, and but a few hundred yards distant, ran the Federal line of battle. ... There were lines of defense, with abatis in front, and long lines of stacked armies in rear. Two cannon were visible in the part of the line seen. The soldiers were in groups in the rear, laughing, chatting, smoking and probably engaged here and there in games of cards and other amusements indulged in while feeling safe and comfortable.... So impressed was I with my discovery, that I rode rapidly back to the point of the Plank Road ... until I met Stonewall himself. 'General,' I said, 'if you will ride with me, halting your column here, out of sight, I will show you the enemy's right and you will perceive the great advantage of attacking down the Old Turnpike instead of by the plank road; the enemy's lines will be taken in reverse. ....' Jackson assented, and I rapidly conducted him to the point of observation. ... I watched him closely as he gazed upon Howard's troops. ... His eyes burned with a brilliant glow, lighting up a sad face. His expression was one of intense interest, his face was colored slightly with the paint of approaching battle, and radiant at the success of his flank movement.

Jackson had to adjust his movement based on this new information, which took more time. It takes a long time for the thousands of men to file in position.

O. O. Howard's Headquarters

Battle of Chancellorsville – May 1, Council of War

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As the fighting wound to a close on May 1, 150 years ago today, Stonewall Jackson met with Robert E. Lee near the Confederate line. Jackson told Lee he thought that Anderson and McLaws were making too easy progress. He thought that Hooker would soon retreat across the river. Lee disagreed. “But, General,” he replied, “we must get ready to attack the enemy, if we should find him here tomorrow, and you must make all arrangements to move around his right flank."

Stuart

Lee and Jackson began planning what would go down as one of the greatest Confederate feats of the war. If Hooker remained, Lee planned to again break the established rules of warfare and divide his force in the face of the superior enemy. While this conference was progressing, JEB Stuart arrived with a report from his cavalry. He said that Fitz Lee, a cavalry general and Robert E. Lee's nephew, had discovered that the Federal right flank was in the air. There was nothing to stop Jackson from marching around and surprising the Federals. Lee decided that he would take this opportunity. Studying the maps, they agreed on a route that Jackson would take in his march early the next morning. Lee asked him what troops he proposed to make the attack with. "With my whole command," Jackson answered. Lee responded, "What will you leave me here to hold the Federal army with?" "The two divisions you have here," replied Jackson. Lee paused for a moment, doubtless to consider the tremendous risks the plan would entail. Jackson wished to leave Lee only two divisions to hold back Hooker's fifteen. Lee quickly made up his mind. "Well, go ahead," he said. This would be Jackson's most brilliant attack of the war.

Battle of Chancellorsville – May 1, First Blood

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On May 1, 150 years ago today, Lee's Confederates got moving to meet the Union force which had positioned themselves on their flank. Waiting for them in the thick woods around Chancellorsville was the main Union force under Gen. “Fighting Joe” Hooker, much larger than the Confederates in numbers. The rebels were leaving behind in Fredericksburg just a token force to resist the powerful Union detachment under John Sedgwick.

Already facing Hooker were the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, the remnant of Longstreet's corps which had been detached to southern Virginia. Since their corps commander was absent, Lee was directing these divisions personally. These greybacks were joined by the corps of Lt. Gen. Stonewall Jackson. Together they advanced to meet the Federals, who were also moving forward in a general advance under orders from Hooker. Fighting broke out around 11:30 am, but it wasn't long before Hooker called a halt.

Up to this point in the campaign he had been successful. He had boldly moved around the Confederate position, and was admirably positioned to drive back the smaller Confederate force opposing him. But at this point he lost his nerve. Instead of continuing to pursue an active attack, he ordered his troops back before they reached their objectives, having determined on taking up a defensive position around Chancellorsville. Hooker's subordinates were disgusted with this decision. They were abandoning the high ground for little reason. In a few hours Hooker had completely changed his plans from a bold offensive to waiting to receive Lee's attack. Perhaps he thought that he had made to much progress against Lee, and that he was falling into a trap. On the other hand he may have simply been scared and unprepared too control the huge army.

Couch

Union Corps commander Darius Couch made his way to headquarters to report on his movements. He later wrote:

Proceeding to the Chancellor House, I narrated my operations in front to Hooker, which were seemingly satisfactory, as he said: 'It is all right, Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him; he must fight me on my own ground.' The retrograde movement had prepared me for something of this kind, but to hear from his own lips that the advantages gained by the successful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets was too much, and I retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man.

Couch was right. Hooker's decision to halt the advance was one of the major turning points of the campaign. He was giving Lee the opportunity he needed to launch one of the greatest attacks of his career.

Hooker