Election of 1864

Lincoln

Throughout Lincoln's term as president there was significant resistance to him in the north. On one side there were the Radical Republicans who did not think Lincoln was firm enough on the issue of slavery, and on the other were the Democrats, some of whom even wanted immediate peace with the south. As the election of 1864 approached, it was clear that there would be obstacles in Lincoln's path for reelection. By the time of the election, the war had stretched on for nearly four bloody years, and there were many who did not think Lincoln was the man to end it.

Frémont's campaign poster

Early in the year Lincoln foiled plans from Salmon P. Chase, his Secretary of the Treasury, to become president. The Radical Republicans did nominate a candidate. At a convention in May, the “Radical Democrats,” as they called themselves, chose John C. Frémont, a former Union general. Frémont accepted the nomination, but offered to resign if Lincoln did not run for reelection. Lincoln did run, but Frémont dropped out anyway, in exchange for the resignation of Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, a Democrat.

Lincoln and Johnson

Lincoln did not run again as a Republican. Instead his supporters held the National Union Convention, an alliance of the Republicans with some War Democrats. The idea was that they were putting aside politics, and instead focusing on winning the war. To strengthen the coalition, vice president Hannibal Hamlin, a Republican, was replaced with Andrew Johnson, the military governor of Tennessee and a Democrat.

The Democrats also ran a candidate, but their party was badly divided. Some wanted to continue fighting the war until the Union was reestablished, others wanted an immediate negotiated peace. This strife was evident in the results of the convention, held in Chicago. They nominated George B. McClellan, the general, for president, and George Pendleton, Representative from Ohio, for vice-president. The party platform was anti war, calling for immediate cessation of hostilities. But they had nominated McClellan, who was continuing the war.

Cartoon of McClellan

The division among the Democrats caused confusion in the advertising and propaganda during the campaign. The Republicans argued that McClellan's election would mean armistice, peace and despotism. Their motto was “Don't change horses in the middle of a stream,” trying to win the support of War Democrats so Lincoln could win the war. Early in the year, Lincoln did not believe that he could win reelection, and hoped to win the war before he would turn over the presidency. By November, the tide had turned. With the fall of Atlanta in September it seemed that the Union was winning battles, and that ultimate victory was in site.

Republican campaign poster

Although as the election approached things were looking up for Republicans, it was still far from a sure thing. Republicans worked to get Nevada's statehood approved at the eleventh hour, as they believed those votes would go to Lincoln. Congress had voted to allow Nevada to join back in March, along with Colorado and Nebraska, but before statehood could be finalized they needed to receive state constitutions adopted by popular conventions. Nebraska voted against becoming a state and Colorado did not adopt a Constitution. Nevada, however, passed a constitution, but the copies they sent to Washington did not arrive. Finally the governor decided to telegraph the constitution to Washington. It took two days to send the more than 16,000 words. This was the longest telegraph sent up to that point. The bill for the telegraph was $4,303.27 - more than $63,000 today. With the constitution sent in, Nevada was admitted to the Union on October 31. Just a week later, Lincoln carried the state in the election.

The election was held on November 8th, 150 years ago today. In an era before electronic vote counting or instant communication, election results could take weeks or months to arrive. But by the night of November 8th, enough counts had come in to be pretty certain that Lincoln would be reelected. The result turned out to be a Lincoln landslide. He won 212 electoral votes to McClellan's 21, loosing only New Jersey and Kentucky. The popular vote was significantly closer, with Lincoln winning 55% to McClellan's 45%. The Republicans also increased their majority in both the House and Senate. The voters had approved Lincoln's conduct of the war.

Late at night Lincoln gave a speech from the White House to a group of Pennsylvanians who were serenading him with a band. He said:

[A]ll who nave labored to-day in behalf of the Union organization have wrought for the best interests of their country and the world, not only for the present, but for all future ages. I am thankful to God for this approval of the people. … I do not impugn the motives of any one opposed to me. It is no pleasure to me to triumph over any one; but I give thanks to the Almighty for this evidence of the people's resolution to stand or free government and the rights of humanity.

Lincoln in 1864

McClellan Removed from Command

Lincoln and McClellan

Lincoln had been dissatisfied with George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, for a long time. McClellan was very slow and cautious on the offensive, always demanding more troops and supplies without energetically putting them to good use. Even when he had been reappointed to command it was only because of the emergency of Lee's invasion of Maryland. After Lee retreated across the Potomac after the Battle of Antietam, Lincoln became more and more frustrated at McClellan's conduct. For weeks the army sat idle on the banks of the Potomac while Lee regrouped his army after a trying campaign.

But Lincoln decided to give McClellan one last chance. Because of the position of the armies, it appeared that the Federals had the chance, if they moved quickly, to get between Lee and Washington, forcing a battle on ground of the Yankee's choosing. However, McClellan failed yet again. Scouts reported that the Confederates had successfully blocked McClellan's road to Richmond. It was time for McClellan to go.

Burnside

Lincoln's order said:

By direction of the President, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army. Also that Major-General Hunter take command of the corps in said army which is now commanded by General Burnside. That Major-General Fitz John Porter be relieved from the command of the corps he now commands in said army, and that Major-General Hooker take command of said corps.

He wrote this on November 5th, after the midterm elections, when the Democrats had gained more seats in the House, and the Republicans in the Senate. The message was delivered early on the 7th, two days later.

The man chosen to deliver the message was Brigadier General Catherinus Buckingham, who was working at the War Department. He was entrusted with the task of giving McClellan the message informing him of his removal from command, and another to Ambrose Burnside to convince him to take the post. Buckingham went first to Burnside, who was completely shocked and immediately refused. Burnside said he didn't want the command and did not think he was fit for it. In fact, he had refused it twice before, and McClellan was a friend of his. Finally, after over an hour of discussions, Buckingham was able to convince him to accept the command.

Lincoln and his generals after Antietam

McClellan accepted the order removing him of command with little emotion. There was always some danger that the general being removed, especially one so well loved by the troops as McClellan, would try to stage a rebellion. McClellan would not do that. He would obey the orders from Washington. However, he did not believe he had made any mistakes warranting his removal from command. He wrote to his wife:

They have made a great mistake. Alas for my poor country! I know in my inmost heart she never had a truer servant. I have informally turned over the command to Burnside, but shall go to-morrow to Warrenton with him, and perhaps remain a day or two there in order to give him all the information in my power... Do not be at all worried - I am not. I have done the best I could for my country; to the last I have done my duty as I understand it. That I must have made many mistakes I cannot deny. I do not see any great blunders; but no one can judge of himself. Our consolation must be that we have tried to do what was right; if we have failed it was not our fault.

McClellan and his wife

Lincoln Urges McClellan to Advance

Lincoln and McClellan

Although McClellan had fought Lee to a draw a the Battle of Antietam in September, he had failed to make the most of that victory. For weeks his troops had remained in position, while Lee fell back to Virginia and reorganized his army, and J.E.B. Stuart raided the Union rear. In October McClellan attributed his inaction and failure to obey Lincoln's direct orders to advance to fatigued horses. Lincoln famously replied, 150 years ago today, “Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"

Stuart Again Rides Around McClellan

 After successfully warding of McClellan in the Battle of Antietam and recrossing the Potomac into Virginia, Lee's army quickly recovered. Troops which had scattered returned to the army, and the men rested and refitted. McClellan, meanwhile, was characteristically slow, and weeks passed without him launching a pursuit. Lee was so encouraged that he even considered again invading Maryland. Although he gave up that idea as too dangerous, he planned for Stuart to go on another of his famous raids to get information as to McClellan's position and plans.

Stuart set out on October 9th with 1,800 picked troopers. He crossed the Potomac River and ride all the way to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, temporarily cutting McClellan's supply line. He pushed his men hard and fast, rounding up horses and getting all the information he could. 150 years ago today he returned to the bank of the Potomac River, only to find two hundred Pennsylvania infantry blocking his way. Stuart sent out skirmishers, and ordered Pelham to deploy his artillery. The cannon shots quickly scattered the Yankees blocking their way. The rebel cavalry began crossing the river, their rear guarded from Federal pursuers by Pelham's guns.

The Gallant Pelham at West Point in 1858

Stuart's raid was successful, having ridden 120 miles in 60 hours without loosing a man. He had captured 1,200 horses and inflicted about a quarter of a million dollars worth of damage. It had been very successful as far as it went, bringing new glories on Stuart and the south, and scaring and embarrassing the Federals. When Lincoln was asked about the raid he drew a circle in the ground and said, "When I was a boy we used to play a game, three times round and out. Stuart has been round him twice; if he goes round him once more, gentlemen, McClellan will be out!"

Lee Retreats

Lee

In the Battle of Antietam Lee's lines had been pressed hard, but had held firm. He decided to remain on the battlefield the next day and hazard a renewal of the battle. However, there was no fighting the next day. Lee was in no condition to fight, and although McClellan had fresh troops available, he was convinced that Lee was planning to attack him. After the a truce to remove the wounded, Lee retreated that night across the river back into Virginia.

Lee's first invasion of the north was over. The campaign had started out with brilliant prospects, but the discovery of Lee's lost orders spurred the usually sluggish McClellan into quick action. Lee was able to capture Harper's Ferry and reunify his army. In the Battle of Sharpsburg or Antietam he beat off uncoordinated Union attacks and McClellan did not continue to press with his superior numbers. Lee retreated across the river, his invasion beaten back. The campaign had turned upon the providential discovery of Special Orders 191. If that event had not happened, the campaign, and perhaps even the war, may well have turned out very differently.

Battle of Antietam - Conclusion

With Hill's counterattack the Battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg as it was called by the south, was over. All along the line, the Northerners had pushed the rebels hard. The Confederates had come very close to defeat on the left, center and right, and had to shift reinforcements between positions. However, the attacks were not pressed or coordinated between the sections of the Union army. Burnside on the right took a long time to cross the creek and form his men, allowing A. P. Hill to arrive. McClellan still may have had a chance at victory if he had pressed the attacks. His men who had fought were broken, but he still had plenty of reserves. He had four divisions from Franklin and Porter's corps, 40,000 fresh men, but he refused to send them into the battle. He was afraid that the Confederates would counter attack. He was not willing to take the risk, as he explained in his report:

I am aware of the fact that under ordinary circumstances a general is expected to risk a battle if he has a reasonable prospect of success; but at this critical juncture I should have had a narrow view of the condition of the country had I been willing to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. At that moment--Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland invaded--the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched, as it pleased, on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied its supplies from a fertile and not devastated country, extorted tribute from wealthy and populous cities, and nowhere east of the Alleghenies was there another organized force able to arrest its march.

If he had attacked, he probably would have destroyed Lee's army. Lee had thrown every unit available into the combat. At times, all that stood before McClellan was a few cannon and stragglers, but McClellan had convinced himself that Lee was reserving 100,000 men to deal him a fatal blow. By failing to press his successes, McClellan turned what should have been a resounding Union victory into a tactical draw.

The Confederates were considering a retreat, not an assault. They had no units or reserves left, but if they could defeat McClellan again, they could launch an offensive into the North with little to stand against them. Lee called a council of war at his headquarters, with Jackson, the Hills, McLaws, Walker, Good, Early and Longstreet. Each commander reported heavy losses, and there was little confidence of being able to hold their ground if attacked. Lee however, decided to rest and stay where he was.

The day after the battle a truce was made to carry for the wounded. The losses had been heavy on both sides. The Confederates lost 2,108 killed, 9,540 wounded and 753 missing. The Federals lost 1,546 killed, 7,752 wounded and 1,018 missing. It remains the bloodiest day in American history. There were bloodier battles in the Civil War, but there have never been this many American battlefield casualties who all fell on a single day.

Union burial party

Battle of Antietam – Bloody Lane

Meanwhile the battle shifted south to the center of the line. Instead of following up on what his men had fought for in the cornfield, McClellan made no efforts to focus his attacks there. Another of Sumner's divisions, under William French, had gotten lost when moving towards disaster and had veered off to the left. There, waiting for them, were D. H. Hill's men. They were in what was called the Sunken Road, or later, Bloody Lane. It was a naturally entrenched position, in which shelter the Confederates could simply meet the Federal attacks. Hill's men had already fought in the defense of the cornfield. But since the battle was now shifting south, they would fight again, this time against different Federals. When French encountered Confederate skirmishers, he eagerly put his men into line for the attack. There was little maneuvering they could make without opening a dangerous whole in the Union line, so they simply charged the road. The attack began around 9:30. As the Federals marched towards the Confederate line, the rebels jeered at them, telling them to go home. "The stillness was literally oppressive,” wrote Colonel John Gordon of the 6th Alabama,

as in close order, with the commander still riding in front, this column of Union infantry moved majestically in the charge. In a few minutes they were within easy range of our rifles, and some of my impatient men asked permission to fire. "Not yet," I replied. "Wait for the order." Soon they were so close that we might have seen the eagles on their buttons; but my brave and eager boys still waited for the order. Now the front rank was within a few rods of where I stood. It would not do to wait another second, and with all my lung power I shouted " Fire !" My rifles flamed and roared in the Federals' faces like a blinding blaze of lightning accompanied by the quick and deadly thunderbolt. The effect was appalling. The entire front line, with few exceptions, went down in the consuming blast. The gallant commander and his horse fell in a heap near where I stood--the horse dead, the rider unhurt. Before his rear lines could recover from the terrific shock, my exultant men were on their feet, devouring them with successive volleys. Even then these stubborn blue lines retreated in fairly good order. My front had been cleared; Lee's centre had been saved; and yet not a drop of blood had been lost by my men. The result, however, of this first effort to penetrate the Confederate centre, did not satisfy the intrepid Union commander.

The Sunken Road from above

French launched several more attacks trying to capture the Sunken Road, but all were failures. Not a man reached the Confederate position. Although he had twice Hill's numbers, French had lost 1,750 men and still could not capture the road. Reinforcements arrived for both sides. Lee decided to send forward his final reserve division under Richard Anderson to join Hill. French was reinforced by the fresh troops of Richardson's divisions. The first attack of an Irish Brigade was unsuccessful, but the next, the fifth brigade to go into the fight, attained more success. Some Federals attained a good position to fire on the Confederate right, and an order was given to bend back the right flank to meet the threat. However, the order was misunderstood, and all of the troops holding the Sunken Road began a retreat. The Confederate situation had been worsened by the loss of several important leaders. Richard Anderson had been wounded soon after arriving on the field, and Colonel Gordon collapsed unconscious after being wounded a fifth time. He may have drowned in his own blood if he had not been for a bullet hole in his cap allowing the blood to drain.

With the Sunken Road abandoned, there was a serious defect in the Confederate line. The Federals had broken through the center, and there was little to oppose their continuing on and rolling up to the right and left. Longstreet was on hand, and he worked desperately with Hill to delay the Federals as long as possible. They found two cannon, but their crew were soon hit by the numerous Federal cannon. So Longstreet's staff dismounted and manned the cannon while Longstreet held their horses. Meanwhile Hill was trying to find any infantry he could lay his hands on. He rallied a few fugitives and created a straggler line, and with this thin line kept the Sunken Road under fire. Hill, watching the Northerners in the road thought that they were about to attack him. Knowing this would be disastrous, he determined to strike first. He asked for volunteers to attempt a charge. None of the men would step forward, until finally one man said he would if Hill would lead them. So grabbing a rifle he set forward with only 200 men. As expected, they made no headway, but for whatever reason the Federals made no movement forward from the Sunken Road. Most of Franklin's fresh corps had arrived, 8,000 soldiers, but Sumner would not let him. Franklin protested, but Sumner told him that they were about to be attacked, and they should not even consider going on the offensive. When a messenger arrived from McClellan with a suggestion to attack, Sumner sent him back saying

Go back, young man, and tell General McClellan I have no command! Tell him my command, Bank's command, and Hooker's command are all cut up and demoralized. Tell him General Franklin has the only organized command on this part of the field!

McClellan came from his headquarters himself to make the decision, and he sided with Sumner. He was too cautious to hazard an attack, and decided that they would just have to hold on to what they gained. He did not understand that he still outnumbered the Confederates, and the rebels were just holding on by a thin thread. No more attacks would be made on the left or center. Both sides had paid dearly for the fight over the Sunken Road. 5,600 men from both sides were either killed or wounded. So many Confederates had fallen in the road that it was said you cold walk from one end to the other on the bodies. After the battle it was given the ominous name of Bloody Lane.

Battle of Antietam - Bloody Cornfield

Confederate Artillery near Dunker Church

Dawn broke at 6:00 on the morning of September 17th 1862. The hollows of the fields around Antietam were filled with mist. The battle had begun hours before with Hooker's Corps moving toward Stonewall Jackson's position. To attack Jackson they would move through a forty acre field of corn that was owned by David Miller. It was bordered on three sides by woods, called West, North and East, while to the South lay Dunker Church. Jackson already knew of Hooker's position and plans. Hooker had advanced a skirmish line the day before, alerting the Confederates. The attack came as no surprise. Colonel Stephen D. Lee had four batteries of artillery posted on the plateau near Dunker Church, and more artillery was placed on the left. In the cornfield was posted the brigades of Jones and Lawton, with more brigades in reserve. Stuart's cavalry was on the left, guarding the flank. As soon as the day dawned an artillery duel began between the cannon on both sides. The fire was terrific from both sides. "Pray that you may never see another Sharpsburg.” Stephen Lee later told a subordinate, “Sharpsburg was artillery hell.”

On the Federal side although Mansfield's corps had not yet arrived, Hooker decided to go forward with his men anyway. He hoped to gain fame and renown for defeating Jackson without the help of Mansfield. Doubleday's division was on the right, Rickett's on the left and Meade's in the rear in reserve. They were heading for the Confederate artillery positioned at the Dunker Church. As they advanced forward they were struck with a crossfire from the Confederate artillery. Men began to fall, and soon after the start of the advance a Union Brigadier General was hit. The Federals soon saw Confederates ahead in the corn, their bayonets glistening in the air. Hooker brought up his artillery, opened fire on the Confederates, and ordered his infantry to charge. On the right of the turnpike the charge was spearheaded by the Iron Brigade, with their tall black hats and famous fighting powers. Under John Gibbon, a North Carolinian, they spearheaded the attack of Doubleday's division. The fighting was very heavy throughout the cornfield. Major Rufus Dawes of the Iron Brigade wrote:

Our lines on the left now came sweeping forward through the corn and the open field beyond. I ordered my men up to join the advance, and commanded: 'Forward - guide left - march!' ... At the front edge of the corn-field was a low Virginia rail fence. Before the corn were open fields, beyond which was a strip of woods surrounding a little church, the Dunkard church. As we appeared at the edge of the corn, a long line of men in butternut and gray rose up from the ground. Simultaneously, the hostile battle lines opened a tremendous fire upon each other. Men, I cannot say fell; they were knocked out of the ranks by the dozens. But we jumped over the fence, and pushed on, loading, firing, and shouting as we advanced. There was, on the part of the men, great hysterical excitement, eagerness to go forward, and a reckless disregard of life, of everything but victory. ... Every body tears cartridges, loads, passes guns, or shoots. Men are falling in their places or running back into the corn. ... After a few rods of advance, the line stopped and, by common impulse, fell back to the edge of the corn and lay down on the ground behind the low rail fence. Another lien of our men came up through the corn. We all joined together, jumped over the fence, and again pushed out into the open field. There is a rattling fusillade and loud cheers. 'Forward is the word' The men are loading and firing with demoniacal fury and shouting and laughing hysterically, and the whole field before us is covered with rebels fleeing for life, into the woods. Great numbers of them are shot while climbing over the high post and rail fences along the turnpike.

The Iron Brigade charges

With Lawton's division crushed by Hooker's attack, he sent a message to Hood asking for his assistance. Lawton, Jones and Starke had all been hit, and Jackson's old division was commanded by a Colonel. Hood's men were in the rear cooking their breakfast, their first hot meal in days. But they were needed in the battle, so throwing away their food they fell into line and moved forward to assist Lawton's men. When they arrived on the field the Federals had broken through all the Confederate brigades in the area, and were pushing towards Dunker Church. But Hood's famous Texans gallantly charged into the enemy. Dawes wrote:

A long and steady line of rebel gray, unbroken by the fugitives who fly before us, comes sweeping down through the woods around the church. They raise the yell and fire. It is like a scythe running through our line. ... It is a race for life that each man runs for the cornfield. A sharp cut, as of a switch, stings he calf of my leg as I run. Back to the corn, and back through the corn, the headlong flight continues.

Hooker

Hooker's attack was stopped by the gallant charge of Hood's division, supported on the right by D. H. Hill and on the left by Early. However, the fighting was still terrible. Hood was able to drive Hooker to the north end of the cornfield, but at terrible cost to his men. The 1st Texas lost 80% of its strength in the terrible fighting. "Tell General Jackson,” Hood told a courier, “unless I get reinforcements I must be forced back, but I am going on while I can!"

Hood

Jackson had no reserves available to throw in to the fight, so he sent a request to Lee. Lee had already sent Walker's division from the right, and sent McLaw's as well. There was always the risk that McClellan would launch an attack on the Confederate right, but that had to be taken. If Jackson's line gave, it would mean disaster for the entire army.

Mansfield

However, Hooker's attack was over. All his strength had been used up. He sent a message to Mansfield, who had now arrived, for him to try his hand at the attack. Joseph Mansfield was an old army soldier, but like many of his men this was his fist battle in war. Mansfield thought that Hooker's men were driving the Confederates, and that he was only coming to complete the victory. Advancing towards the rebel lines, he was surprised when he was fired upon, thinking he were being fired on by his friends. He discovered his mistake, but the Confederate line fired a volley, hitting Mansfield in the stomach. He was brought to the rear, and died the next day. His men continued on under the command of Alpheus Williams. They were able to push Hood's veterans back through the cornfield into the west woods. D. H. Hill wrote in his official report:

[O]ur progress was arrested by a lane, on either side of which was a high, staked fence stretching along our whole front.... The men, being formed along this fence, kept up an accurate and well-sustained fire, which visibly told upon the enemy's ranks; and, although we suffered greatly, as well from musketry in front as from a battery on our left ... not a man was seen to flinch from the conflict. ... [O]ur left being unprotected, we were about to be outflanked, when the order to retire was given and obeyed, the men withdrawing in tolerable order, and fighting as they fell back.

However Walker and McLaws arrived, and throwing their throwing into the fight Jackson was able to keep Williams's corps at bay. Williams was not able to press forward, and requested reinforcements from McClellan. Reinforcements were already coming up in the form the lead division of Sumner's corp. They did not go directly into the cornfield. They came further to the south through the edge of the East Woods, shifting the battle from the Confederate left to center. Sumner, in his eagerness to get his men into battle, made an important mistake. He neglected his flank. He stumbled into Confederates under McLaws and Walker, who happened to be at the right place at the right time. Their volleys tore through Sumner's men, who were virtually unable to defend themselves. Surrounded on three sides, Sumner's men held out for twenty minutes before breaking into a rout. Out of the 5,4000 soldiers who went into the fight, 2,200 fell. One regiment lost over 50% of its 600 men. The corps of Hooker, Mansfield and part of Sumner's after three hours of heavy fighting had gained a foothold on the Dunker Church Plateau, but the Confederates by stripping men from the right had been able to prevent their line from being demolished. The cornfield in which much of the battle had taken place was covered with bodies, fallen down in rows marking the positions of the troops. It was called the Bloody Cornfield. Hooker wrote

In the time that I am writing every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before. It was never my fortune to witness a more bloody, dismal battlefield.

Jackson lost around 5,000 men. When Hood was asked where his division was, he said “it was dead on the field.” It did not seem as though they could put up much of a defense against another attack. However, the battle was over in Jackson's section of the line. Sumner was badly scared by his reverse, and was wounded in the hand. As ranking officer in the area, he would allow no more attacks, believing that he was about to be over run by a counterattack. As it was, the Confederates were doubting their own ability to resist another attack.

Battle of Antietam – Introduction

Lee and McClellan's armies at Sharpsburg were arrayed for battle roughly along Antietam Creek. The landscape was that of rolling farmland and groves of trees, and Lee was in a strong defensive position, but no where near impregnable. His army was along an approximately four mile long low ridge overlooking the valley containing the creek. Both of his flanks were anchored along the sides of a bend in the Potomac River. Although this meant that he could not be flanked, it also meant that if defeated it would be very difficult to make an orderly retreat. Lee's position could be broken down into three parts, distinguished by recognizable landmarks. On the left was Jackson's Corps around Dunker Church and the Cornfield. In the center was D. H. Hill's division along the Sunken Road, a road bordered by fences which formed a natural trench. On the right was Longstreet's Corps, and the landmark there was what was later called Burnside's Bridge over Antietam Creek. By the time Lee was attacked on the 17th, all of his scattered troops had arrived except for A. P. Hill. His division was on it's way from Harper's Ferry, and would arrive sometime that day.

Antietam

McClellan, after personally examining the Confederate position, decided to attack the Confederate left. On the right the bridges were overlooked more closely by the bluffs. He hoped to overwhelm the left and then move South down the ridge, driving Lee off the ridge and into the Potomac. He also ordered attacks to be made on the center and right, which would serve as diversions, and could also be turned into a main attack if successful. Fighting Joe Hooker's and Mansfield's corps would attack on the Confederate left, Franklin and Sumner would be available to attack there or in the center, Burnside would attack the right, with Porter in reserve to resist a counter attack. In the afternoon of the 16th McClellan had his troops moving into position. Troops began crossing the creek over the North bridge to get in position for the fight of the next day. McClellan's plans would not be put into coordinated execution. The corps commanders dd not communicate well, and through the rolling nature of the ground they could not do it by sight. At his headquarters in the rear, McClellan exercised little direct control. The battle therefore occurred in three separate phrases, with little connection to each other from the Union perspective.

Armies Moves to Antietam

After McClellan's capture of South Mountain on the 15th, the fall of Harper's Ferry to Stonewall Jackson on the 15th came just in time to redeem the Union fortunes for the campaign. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was moving on the 16th to concentrate on Sharpsburg, Maryland, along the banks of the Potomac River. McClellen was already in Sharpsburg with his army. However, he refused to attack. Just days before he had been confident that with Lee's Lost Order telling of the division of his army he could, without a doubt, whip Bobby Lee. But now he lost that confidence. Although he should have known Lee's army was divided, he spent the day reconnoitering instead of pushing forward to attack. This mistake meant that instead of crushing a small part of Lee's army, he would have a hart fight the next day against a unified Confederate army.

Battle of Harper's Ferry - Day 2

On September 13th, 150 years ago yesterday, the Confederates were able to occupy the high ground around Harper's Ferry. The Federals had given them the key to the position, but it would take time to make the most of it. Jackson ordered that guns be placed on the heights, and that none open until they could open fire all at once. This required a lot of hard work dragging heavy guns up the steep mountain sides. It took 200 men per gun to place four Parrott rifles on the summit of Maryland Heights. Walker was able to get his guns on Loudoun Heights placed fairly quickly, and impatient at the slowness of the preparations, opened fire at 1 pm. However, alone these guns were ineffectual and they soon ceased fire. The Federals realized they didn't have much time left. However, no effort was made to recapture the heights. If they had attacked Maryland Heights, it is likely that it would have been successful, as all of the troops there had been withdrawn except for one regiment to join the battle of Crampton's Gap.

Davis

Dixon Miles, Union commander, did allow another movement to be made. Colonel Benjamin Franklin “Grimes” Davis, commander of the 12th Illinois Cavalry and other mounted Union units in Harper's Ferry, proposed an attempt to break out. The cavalry would be useless in a siege, but at first Miles dismissed the idea as impractical, but Davis finally convinced him. Davis led his 1,400 cavalry across the Potomac and around the base of Maryland Heights. They had several close calls with rebels, but they were able to avoid detection. On their way back to Union lines they encountered a wagon train. It was Longstreet's reserve supply of ammunition. Unprotected by Confederates, it was an easy prey. They were able to trick the drivers into following them in a different direction, drove off the escort in the rear of the column, and brought the 40 wagons back to Union lines. Up to this point in the east Stuart's Confederate troops had literally ridden circles around the Yankees, but now, without loosing a man, Davis had performed the first great cavalry exploit of the Union army.

Battle of South Mountain

McClellan, having captured the Lost Order the day before, advanced towards South Mountain on September 14th, 150 years ago today. He know knew the position of the Confederate columns, but standing in his way was South Mountain. Running north south it was held by D. H. Hill's division. Lee had not expected to have to hold the mountain, as McClellan had been advancing slowly. But with the discovery of Lee's plans McClellan took more initiative than he was wont and began an attack on the mountain.

D. H. Hill

There were three main gaps in which fighting took place. Hill held only the two north most, Turner's and Fox's, but he still had only 5,000 to defend these positions separated by two miles. Further south was Crampton's Gap, held by a small force from McLaw's division. McClellan assaulted Turner's and Fox's gaps with his main army, while Franklin attacked Crampton's Gap with his corps in an attempt to raise the siege of Harper's Ferry.

Jesse Reno

McClellan advanced cautiously, as he did not know the small numbers of rebels holding the gap. Confused and fierce fighting continued throughout the day. Jesse Reno, commander of the 9th Corps made an attempt to Fox's gap. Hill sent in Samuel Garland's brigade, but Garland commanded inexperienced troops, and they were confused. The Federals were able to slowly push back the Confederates. Both Garland and Reno fell in the fighting. The Federal advance was halted by the timely arrival of Confederate reinforcements under John Bell Hood.

D. H. Hill went up to a lookout station and saw

the vast array of McClellan spread out before me. The marching columns extended back as far as eye could see in the distance; but many of the troops had already arrived and were in double lines of battle, and those advancing were taking up positions as fast as they arrived. It was a grand and glorious spectacle, and it was impossible to look at it without admiration. I had never seen so tremendous an army before, and I did not see one like it afterward.

Hooker's 1st coprs attacked Turner's gap. His preparations for the attack were slow, and by the time he attacked at 4 pm, Longstreet's men were arriving to bolster Hill's thin line. Rufus Dawes of the Iron Brigade, one of Hooker's most famous units, wrote:

From Turner's gap in our front, and along the right on the summit of the mountain, the artillery of the enemy was firing, and we could see the shells bursting over and amoung our advancing troops. For nearly an hour we laid upon the grassy knoll, passive spectators of the scene. The sun was sinking behind the mountain, when our order came to move forward. ... For half a mile of advance, our skirmishers played a deadly game of 'Bo-peep.' hiding behind logs, fences, rocks and bushes. ... Our skirmishers ... encountered the enemy in force and were behind a fence. ... Suddenly the seventh Wisconsin halted and opened fire, and we could see a rapid spitting of musketry flashes from the woods above and in front of us, and wounded men from the sevent began to hobble by us. ... Our whole line was slowly advanced up the mountain, the men shouting and firing. ... The rebels fell back from the woods, but stuck to the stone wall. The hostile lines had approached each other closely and the fire was deadly. It was dark and our only aim was by the flashes of the enemy's guns.

Down at Crampton's Gap, Franklin had attained more success. He broke through the Confederate defenders, capturing the gap in the afternoon. But he would be too late to aid Harper's Ferry. The delays in the attacks meant that although Lee had lost key positions on South Mountain, the siege had not been relieved or the army destroyed. The Confederates would have another day to concentrate to avoid destruction.

Dawes

Battle of Harper's Ferry - Day 1

Dixon Miles

The Union officer commanding garrison at Harper's Ferry was Colonel Dixon Miles. A veteran of the Mexican War, he had fought at Bull Run but then, being accused of drunkenness, was sent to Harper's Ferry on garrison duty, a post of less responsibility. But now with his 14,000 he was under attack by converging Confederate columns under the famed Stonewall Jackson. Miles's orders were to hold the town, and he took those orders very strictly. He placed most of the men in the town itself, but the town was indefensible without holding the high ridges surrounding it. On Maryland Heights, across the Potomac River, he did place Colonel Thomas Ford with four regiments. Several batteries were on the heights as well, but they were useless as they were positioned to meet an attack from a different angle.

Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, commanding the Confederate column advancing on the Maryland side of the Potomac, encountered Ford's troops on the Heights near evening on the 12th, and halted for the night. Kershaw's South Carolina brigade attacked at 6:30 am on the 13th, 150 years ago today. The rebel plan was for Kershaw to attack directly at the Federal breastworks while Barksdale's Mississippi brigade worked around the Union right. At first Ford's green troops held their own. They met Kershaw's attacks from the front, but when the Mississippi troops were seen on their flank, they panicked and ran precipitously off the mountain and across the river, to the supposed safety of the town. With this small force driven back, Miles had lost one of the three keys to the defense of Harper's Ferry. But although his officers pleaded with him to launch a counterattack, he refused. Maryland Heights would remain in Confederate hands.

Harper's Ferry with Maryland Heights on the left and Loudon Heights on the right

While McLaws pushed the Federals off Maryland Heights, the other Confederate columns were arriving in position. Brig. Gen. John Walker found Loundon Heights across the Shenandoah River on the east of Harper's Ferry unoccupied, and occupied it. To the west of Harper's Ferry, Jackson's column occupied Bolivar Heights, astonished that Miles had left this position undefended as well. Holding the high ground, all the Confederates had to do was bring up their artillery and without a doubt Harper's Ferry would soon fall.

Harper's Ferry from Maryland Heights

Miles continued to reject proposals to retake Maryland Heights. He put his troops in position opposite Jackson on Bolivar Heights, and told his subordinates, "I am ordered to hold this place and God ---- my soul to hell if I don't." He did, however, send out 10 cavalry troops which found McClellan and informed him of the situation at Harper's Ferry. McClellan had what he needed to out general Lee – Special Order 191, the Lost Order. He assured Miles,

"You may count on our making every effort to relieve you. You may rely upon my speedily accomplishing that object. Hold out to the last extremity. If it is possible, re-occupy the Maryland heights with your whole force."

This order would never arrive, for before a courier could find a way in to beleaguered Harper's Ferry, the town would fall to the rebels.

McClellan Discovers Special Order 191

On September 9th Lee had written Special Order 191, which explained his plan for the campaign. He ordered three columns under the overall direction of Stonewall Jackson to converge on Harper's Ferry and capture it. This would open the Shenandoah Valley and eliminate a force in the Confederate rear. At that point Lee could move north into Pennsylvania with his rear secure. However, it would be a dangerous maneuver, splitting his army into several separate columns while McClellan was still moving to pursue. The order said this:

Special Orders, No. 191
Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia
September 9, 1862

… The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harpers Ferry.

General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.

General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harpers Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harpers Ferry and vicinity.

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with General McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.

General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.

General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.

The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance—wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood &c.

By command of General R. E. Lee
R.H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant General

The order

On September 13th, 150 years ago today, the order was being executed, although it was going slower than planned. However, at about 10:00 am Corporal Barton W. Mitchell of the 27th Indiana, which was camping on a rebel camp ground of a few days before, found a piece of paper wrapped around three cigars. Opening it, he found a copy of Special Orders 191. Two orders had been written for D. H. Hill, and through a staff oversight one was mislaid and dropped at camp, where it was found by this Indiana corporal. Mitchell recognized the document's importance and turned it over to his sergeant. It proceeded up to Corps Commander Alpheus S. Williams, who had a staff officer who recognized the handwriting of that of Richard Chilton, Lee's adjutant, as he remembered his signature from before the war. This proved that the order was genuine, and it was sent up to McClellan himself.

McClellan was overcome with joy when he read the order. It gave him the Confederate plans, and now he only had to push over South Mountain and then fall upon the scattered Confederate columns and destroy them. He told an officer, "Here is a paper with which, if I cannot whip Bobby Lee, I will be willing to go home." this paper was the key to the campaign. The providential loss of the order would result in the failure of Lee's plans for invasion, instead turning the campaign into a desperate effort to save his army.

Lee Invades Maryland

150 years ago today, Robert E. Lee crossed the Potomac into Maryland, beginning his first invasion of the north. He expressed the reasons for it in a letter to president Jefferson Davis:

Mr. President: The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland. The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies ... will take some time to prepare for the field. If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable. The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipments must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss.

There were several other important factors that Lee did not mention. Most Confederates saw the path to victory through foreign intervention. They hoped a European nation would join the war on their side and turn the ballance in their favor. It was hoped with an invasion of the north they would be able to induce nations to join them, as they had demonstrated that they were militarily viable. He would be coordinating with Braxton Bragg in his invasion of Kentucky. The Confederates would be able to be resupplied from the untouched resources of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Maryland was a slave state, and it was hoped that Lee's army would liberate them and induce them to join his army. And lastly, there was always the hope that they would be able to gain military sucess, capture Washington, and dictate terms to the enemy.

In the coming campaign Lee would be facing an opponent who was both new and old. John Pope, after his decisive defeat at the battle of 2nd Manassas, was removed from command and treated essentially with military exile, in an appointment to quell an Indian uprising (the subject of a future post.) He was replaced with George B. McClellan, who Lee had defeated in the Seven Days. Lincoln's cabinet was very much against this change, as McClellan had demonstrated his reluctance to work actively against Lee. Lincoln replied:

"We must use what tools we have. There is no man in the Army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he. If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."