Battle of Chattanooga

Tunnel Hill
150 years ago today, the Federals executed their attack on the Confederates at Chattanooga. Hooker was to continue to press on the Confederate right, Sherman on the left, and Thomas in the center. Sherman was at a positioned called Tunnel Hill. His 16,600 men were met at first by only 4,000 under Patrick Cleburne, who barely made it back to the battle in time. Cleburne's brave men were entrenched on Tunnel Hill which took its name from the railroad tunnel which cut through it. Sherman had chosen the strongest position on the Confederate line to attack. At dawn he sent two brigades forward under Brigadier General John Corse. They were stopped hard by Cleburne's men. The Confederates could throw stones down from their position and do almost as much damage as the bullets they shot. Corse's men could make no headway and were forced back. Sherman sent more lines forward, dashing them against Cleburne's line. One Federal wrote,

We had been concealed from the enemy all the forenoon by the edge of a wood; yet his constant shelling of this wood showed that he knew we were there. As the column came out upon the open ground, and in sight of the rebel batteries, their renewed and concentrated fire knocked the limbs from the trees about out heads. An awful cannonade had opened on us. ... I had heard the roaring of heavy battle before, but never such a shrieking of cannon-balls and bursting of shells as met us on that run. We could see the rebels working their guns, while in plain view other batteries galloped up, unlimbered and let loose upon us. ... In ten minutes the field was crossed, the foot of the ascent was reached, and now the Confederates poured into our faces the reserved fire of their awful musketry. It helped little that we returned it from our own rifles, hidden as the enemy were in rifle pits, behind logs, and stumps, and trees. ... Then someone cried, 'Look to the tunnel!' There, on the right, pouring through a tunnel in the mountain, and out of the railway cut, came the graycoats by hundreds, flanking us completely. ... They were through by the hundreds, and a fatal enfilading fire was cutting our line to pieces.

Sherman continued attacking for six hours, never breaking through the rebel line. When the Federals gained any foothold, Cleburne shifted his troops and launched a strong counterattack, himself at the head of his men. Charging down the hill they broke the Federal lines. By late in the afternoon, Sherman's attacks had accomplished nothing. He had lost almost 2,000 men, while Cleburne had skillfully held his position, loosing only about 200. One Confederate who visited the battlefield wrote,

They had swept their front clean of Yankies, indeed, when I went up about sundown the side of the ridge in their front was strewn with dead yankies & looked like a lot of boys had been sliding down the hill side, for when a line of the enemy would be repulsed, they would start down hill & soon the whole line would be rolling down like a ball, it was so steep a hill side there.

Grant watching the battle

Missionary Ridge
Not all of the Confederate line had put up such a good fight as Cleburne. The odds in the center of the Confederate line were much better for the Confederates. While Cleburne had only one division to fight six, here Bragg had four to Thomas's five. In the center, Grant ordered Thomas to go forward at 3:30 pm after it was clear Sherman was making no headway. Ten minutes after the order was given, six cannon rang out, the signal for the 25,000 Federals to move forward towards the Confederate gun pits. Bragg had 112 cannon on the 400 foot ridge, and they opened at once on the advancing Northerners. The cannon balls tore into the Federal lines, but they were not halted. They broke into a run towards the ridge, with yells of "Chickamauga! Chickamauga!", remembering their defeat of a few weeks before. They rushed forward and captured the line of rifle pits. The second Confederate line in the middle of the ridge opened a heavy fire upon the intruders. At first the men were pinned down, but instead of fleeing, the men began to move slowly up the slope. They had no orders to advance, they moved of their own accord. They wanted to come to grips with the enemy rather than lay there and be shot. One Yankee wrote:

Above, the summit of the hill was one sheet of flame and smoke, and the awful explosions of artillery and musketry made the earth fairly tremble. Below, the columns of dark blue, with the old banner of beauty and of glory leading them on, were mounting up with leaning forms.... Cannon shot tore through their ranks; musket balls were rapidly and tearfully decimating them; behind them, the dead and wounded lay thick as autumn leaves.... With a wild cheer and a madder rush our men dashed forward, and for a few moments a sharp, desperate, almost hand-to-hand fight with bayonet and ball ensued. Before this resistless assault the rebel line was lifted as by a whirlwind, and borne backward, shattered, bleeding and confused.

The strong position was not taken just because of the bravery of the Federal troops, there were problems with the position itself. Although it was strong naturally, that strength made the defenders careless. The order for the first line to fall back after a few volleys had not been communicated to all the troops, so there was confusion and demoralization. The engineers had also made a bad mistake, placing the top line of rifle pits on the geographical crest rather than the military crest. On Missionary Ridge the defenders had blind spots, since they were on the actual crest. When the Federals came up the hill, not stopped by the Confederate volleys, the men broke and ran for the rear. The officers tried to stem the rout, but it was of no use. Bragg himself tried to rally them, but they ignored him. “Grey clad men rushed wildly down the hill and into the woods,” a Yankee wrote, “tossing away knapsacks, muskets and blankets as they ran. Batteries galloped back along the narrow, winding roads with reckless speed, and officers, frantic with rage, rushed from one panic-stricken group to another, shouting and cursing as they strove to check the headlong flight, but all in vain.”

37 cannon and 3000 men were captured, and Bragg himself barely made his escape. The Confederate center was completely wrecked. the Federals had suffered heavily as well. Sheridan alone, who had delivered the heaviest assault, had lost 1,346 of his 6500 men. Some regiments had over half their men killed or wounded. They halted for a time at the top of the ridge, resting on their gains. The Confederates on the left and right of the line tried to contain the breakthrough as much as possible, fighting the Federals from both directions. Cleburne's men held their ground until after sunset, and they retreated last, the unbroken rear guard of Bragg's army.

Missionary Ridge

During the course of this several day battle for Chattanooga, Bragg had lost 361 killed, 2160 wounded and 4146 captured, while Grant had 753 killed, 4722 wounded and 349 captured. But more importantly, Confederate control of Chattanooga, the gateway to the South, had been lost. Many mistakes had been made which caused Bragg to lose his very strong position. He had bad relations with many of his subordinates, causing some very talented men to have to be removed from his command so that the army could continue to function. Longstreet had been sent to East Tennessee, weakening the force. The entrenchments on Missionary Ridge had been badly positioned, and orders to the men had been confused. By this time, most of the Confederates were veterans. They knew when to stand and fight and when to run. When they thought they had no chance of success, they ran, with the exception of Cleburne's men on the right.

Battle of Lookout Mountain

Lookout Mountain

According to the Union plan for the Battle of Chattanooga, Joseph E. Hooker attacked the Confederate positions on Lookout Mountain 150 years ago today. Lookout Mountain is a 1,800 foot height rising above Chattanooga and the Tennessee River. The overall commander of the mountain was Brigadier General Carter Stevenson, a West Pointer and career military officer from Virginia. He placed his own brigade on the very summit, with three others on a bench below. Altogether, he had about 8,700 men. Although the mountain looks easy to defend, it actually was more difficult than it appeared. The bench was commanded by Union artillery, and the Federals outnumbered the Southern defenders with their force of 12,000 men. On September 24th, the mountain was wreathed in mist, causing the battle that day to be called romantically, though technically incorrectly, the Battle Above the Clouds.

Hooker's men were supposed to march at dawn, but they were delayed until 8:30 am. As they marched forward, they were covered by 13 Union batteries firing on the Confederate positions. The Federal forces encountered Confederate skirmishers at 9:30 and pushed them back with their superior forces. The Confederates had been told to fall back fighting, as they did not have the strength for a full defense. Stevenson's artillery on the summit of the mountain opened fire, and as the Union advanced close the gunners had to depress their weapons more and more. Finally, the Yankees reached a point where the guns could not be pointed downward any further, making the artillery on the summit useless. Lookout Mountain was too steep for an easy defense, since the cannon could not sweep the entire approach. But the rough ground made the advance hard for the Federal troops. A Union officer wrote of the battle:

[S]lowly yet steadily the assailing lines of battle swept up the rugged mountain, driving before them the enemy's heavy line of skirmishers, which gradually fell back upon the main line of battle.... At this moment the prospect, which to the spectator upon the fortified ridge directly opposite, and where the batteries were stationed, had been one of the most grand and imposing that can be conceived, was suddenly obscured. A dense cloud enveloped the side of the mountain, and though the summit was in full view above the cloud, the furiously contending forces upon the Northern slope were entirely hidden. The incessant clatter and rattle of musketry still continued, but on one, save those in the very midst of the deadly conflict, could declare how it was going, or who would prove triumphant.

Around the Cravens House, a Confederate regiment beat off one attack, but with the next, they were swamped and routed. Stevenson ordered two more brigades to join the original one in attempting to resist the Union drive, but it was of no use. They tried to form a line, but the Federals got around their flank in the mist and the rebels had to retreat. Finally, near sunset, Hooker ordered his men to halt. Although at points he thought he was about to be defeated, his men had captured half of the mountain after a hard fight through the woods, boulders and mist. He intended to continue the fight the next day. But the next day there would be no battle here. Bragg had ordered Stevenson to abandon the mountain which he did through the afternoon and night. Bragg pulled back the left of his army to focus on the defense of Missionary Ridge. This battle had cost Hooker 629 men, the Confederate defenders 1,251, over 1000 of which were captured.

Battle of Orchard Knob

Tennessee River

After the battle of Chickamauga, the Confederate army under Braxton Bragg pursued the Federals to Chattanooga, where a siege began. Ulysses Grant and reinforcements arrived in the town, and the Federals were able to reopen their supply line. Bragg divided his army, sending Longstreet to fight Bragg in east Tennessee. In the mean time, the Federal forces increased. Sherman's forces began arriving on November 20th.

Grant

Grant planned to use Sherman's and Hooker's men to attack Bragg, positioned on the heights around the town. Grant thought that Thomas's troops, who had been defeated at Chickamauga, would not be able to fight. On November 23rd, 150 years ago today, Grant got word that Bragg was abandoning his position. This was not true, he was just sending more men to East Tennessee. By this time, because of the Union reinforcement and the division of the Confederate army, Grant had 76,000 men available to fight, while Bragg had only 43,000.

Grant did not want the Confederates to escape, so he ordered Thomas to attack Orchard Knob, a small rise in front of the main Confederate position on Missionary Ridge. This movement was intended to be a reconnaissance in force to determine the strength of the enemy. At 1:30 pm almost 15,000 Federals moved out in long lines across the fields. They were moving on only 600 Confederates, who fired only one volley before making a hasty retreat.

Orchard Knob

This movement showed Bragg the Federal's intentions, and he recalled the troops he had just sent to Longstreet. Cleburne's division returned in time to participate in the battle, and they would do very good service. The Confederates had neglected to fortify Missionary Ridge during all the weeks of the siege, but the orders were finally given and that work began. But these new entrenchments were constructed with a fatal flaw. They were built on the very top of the ridge, rather than a little below it, on what is called the military crest. This meant that they would not be able see the Yankees for much of their climb up the hill.

Orchard Knob

The Union decided to continue their attack on Bragg, and the generals reworked their plans. The right would attack the Confederate positions on Lookout Mountain, Thomas would continue to press the center at Missionary Ridge, and Sherman would cross the Tennessee River to attack the top of Missionary Ridge on the left.

Siege of Chattanooga - Battle of Wauhatchie Station

When Grant arrived in Chattanooga to take command of the army under siege by Bragg's Confederates, he was told of a plan that had been devised by the army's chief engineer William “Baldy” Smith, to get supplies into the town. He liked it, and ordered that it be put into execution. It was called the Cracker Line. The plan was for supplies to be brought to Kelley's Ferry on the Tennessee, then overland through Cummings Gap in Raccoon Mountain, cross the river again at Brown's Ferry, then brought across the river directly into the city.

To use this line however Bragg's men would have to be driven across Raccoon Mountain. Grant planned to have Hooker move under cover of darkness to meet up with two columns of troops from Thomas, one of which would silently float pass Lookout Mountain while the other would march overland as reinforcements. He ordered that it be put into execution early on the morning of October 27th. The men from Thomas were successful in passing Lookout Mountain without being sighted. They set up a Pontoon bridge and captured Brown's Ferry with little resistance, as few Confederate units had been stationed in the area. The next day Hooker arrived, and the Cracker line was secured right under Bragg's noose. It was put into operation, and know there was no trouble getting men or supplies into Chattanooga.

The Confederates were upset that the siege had been lifted, and immediately began trying to cut the Cracker Line. Longstreet decided to strike at Wauhatchie Station, where John Greary's division was in a weaker position than the rest of Hocker's men. Longstreet ordered a night attack to be made, and it went into effect early on the morning of October 29, 150 years ago today. The strike was scheduled for 10 pm, but the darkness delayed the march for two hours. Greary's men were surprised, and were driven back into a V shaped position anchored on the river. Two Union corps were sent to his aid, and the Confederates fell back in co fusion. The battle had been badly planned on both sides, and the confusion of a night attack destroyed the Confederate chances for victory.

Siege of Chattanooga

After defeating Rosecrans's Union army at the Battle of Chickamauga, Bragg's Confederates received intelligence that their foes were in full retreat, but they did not mount an aggressive pursuit. Bragg did not want to leave the railroad, which was serving as his supply line. The cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forest moved to within three miles of Chattanooga, where the Federals had positioned themselves. The placed could have been easily captured, but Bragg would not move. The fruits of victory were lost by the Confederate failure to advance. Their victory was rendered almost useless.

By the time they arrived on the hills surrounding Chattanooga, the Federals were prepared for a long defense. By September 23rd the Confederates occupied Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and a siege of Chattanooga began. James Longstreet, commanding a corps from Lee temporarily detached to help Bragg, wished to attempt a flanking movement, but Bragg refused. He preferred just to wait and starve out Rosecrans, as he had received word that the Yankees only had six days provisions. He extended the Confederate lines to Raccoon Mountain, and placed artillery to cover the roads that ran along the edge of the Tennessee River. Thus blocking the easiest access to the town, he forced the Federals to carry what supplies they could bring across sixty miles of muddy roads.

Rosecrans

When Lincoln got news of Rosecrans's disaster, he decided to reinforce him without delay. Hooker's Corps from Virginia was rushed west by railroad, and Ulysees S. Grant, who had been given command of all the forces from the Allegheny Mountains to the Mississippi, was ordered to march to Chattanooga with 20,000 men. Although when the siege began Bragg had more men, his decision not to assault meant that after a few days Hooker arrived. With these new men the Union garrison outnumbered the Confederate besiegers.

Chattanooga from Lookout Mountain

The Union high command was not impressed with Rosecrans's performance after his defeat at Chickamauga. Charles Dana, assistant secretary of war reported on Rosecrans

I have never seen a public man possessing talent with less administrative power, less clearness and steadiness in difficulty, and greater practical incapacity than General Rosecrans. ... Under the present circumstances I consider this army to be very unsafe in his hands.

Grant eventually decided to replace Rosecrans with George Thomas, the new Federal hero who had held the field at Chickamauga after Rosecrans and most of the army had fled.

Rosecrans' Campaigns

After defeating Braxton Bragg's army at the Battle of Stone's River in January, William Rosecrans made no movement for six months. He wanted to make sure that he was completely prepared before he risked anything. After much urging from President Lincoln, Rosecrans finally launched a campaign against Bragg. He had 65,000 men to the Confederate's 46,000. Instead of trying a direct attack, he would try to destroy Bragg through maneuver.

Tullohoma Campaign

Bragg had his troops along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad behind a ridge with only four passes. Rosecrans planed to outflank Bragg. He sent his main column through the east most gap, while at the same time another column would feint in the same direction. He hoped that Bragg would see the smaller column as a feint and look for the attack in the wrong direction. At the same time a detachment of mounted infantry drove deep into Bragg's rear. Rosecrans' plan worked perfectly. By the time Bragg realized that the movements on his right were really not a feint, he was convinced by the raid that he needed to retreat. He fell back all the way to the other side of the Tennessee river. Rosecrans, in what some had called the most brilliant campaign of the war, had driven Bragg from a strong position and out of Middle Tennessee. But the nearly bloodless victory was overshadowed by the capture of Vicksburg and defeat of Lee at Gettysburg, and Bragg's army was still intact, and a battle would still have to be fought.

Rosecrans

After this successful campaign, Rosecrans yet again halted. He again refused to move for several weeks to study the terrain and ensure that everything was prepared for another campaign. He would move next on Chattanooga, an important manufacturing and transportation center on the Tennessee-Georgia line.