Battle of Malvern Hill

After maintaining their position in the Battle of Glendale, McClellan set his men to retreating again, to consolidate them on Malvern Hill. Malvern Hill is not steep, rather a long, gradual rise. Although it may not look impressive, it was a very good artillery position, as the Union guns would have plenty of time to fire into the Confederate ranks. As the Confederates moved forward the generals examined McClellan's lines on the hill. D. H. Hill, having heard a description of the place, told Lee, “If General McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone." Longstreet replied laughingly, “Don't get scared, now that we have got him whipped.” Lee decided to press forward, hoping that the Federals were disheartened and would break if pushed. Jackson and Ewell would remain on the left, Holmes, Longstreet and A. P. Hill on the right. The attack would be made by D. H. Hill, Huger and Magruder in the center.

Federal cannon

Crucial to the success of Lee's plan was the role of his artillery. The Confederate cannons needed to neutralize the Federal batteries so that the infantry could attack. However, through mismanagement the Confederate batteries failed completely. The Yankee cannon opened at 1 pm, and the Confederate guns came into action a few at a time. The Federals simply focused on each section as it came into the fight, put it out of action, and moved on to the next one. 100 Confederate guns were supposed to participate in the fight, but only 20 actually made it in. The Confederate artillery positions were soon covered in dead horses and smashed equipment, while the Union guns were virtually untouched.

Although the bombardment was a failure, the rebel infantry would go forward none the less. D. H. Hill advanced in late afternoon, along with Magruder who only got two of his six brigades into the action. Fitz John Porter, Union corps commander, wrote this of the assault:

As if moved by a reckless disregard of life, equal to that displayed at Gaines Mill, with a determination to capture our army, or destroy it by driving us into the river, regiment after regiment, and brigade after brigade, rushed at our batteries; but the artillery of both Morell and Couch mowed them down with shrapnel, grape, and canister; while our infantry, withholding their fire until the enemy were within short range, scattered the remnants of their columns, somethings following them up and capturing prisoners and colors. As column after column advanced, only to met the same disastrous repulse, the sight became one of the most interesting imaginable. The havoc made by the rapidly bursting shells from guns arranged so as to sweep any position far and near, and in any direction, was fearful to behold.

The Confederate attacks were useless, but they came on again and again pressing forward against the hill. D. H. Hill wrote:

I never saw anything more grandly heroic than the advance after sunset of the nine brigades under Magruder's orders. Unfortunately, they did not move together, and were beaten in detail. As each brigade emerged from the woods, from fifty to one hundred guns opened upon it, tearing great gaps in its ranks; but the heroes rolled on and were shot down by the reserves at the guns, which a few squads reached. Most of them had an open field half a mile wide to cross, under the fire of field-artillery in front, and the fire of the heavy ordnance of the gun-boats in their rear. It was not war - it was murder.

When night fell all the Confederate attacks had been bloodily repulsed. 5,300 Southerners had fallen, half of those from the artillery, a very high number.

The Battle of Malvern Hill the Seven Days campaign was over. The casualties had been very heavy. The Confederates had 3,300 dead, 15,900 wounded and 100 missing. The Federals had lost 1,700 killed, 8,060 wounded and 6,050 captured. Many mistakes had been made. McClellan had retreated before numbers less than his own, convinced he had just escaped destruction. He pulled his men of Malvern Hill to a camp along the river, under cover of the gunboats. He telegraphed Washington,

My men are completely exhausted and I dread the result if we are attacked today by fresh troops.... I now pray for time. My men have proved themselves the equals of any troops in the world, but they are worn out.... We have failed to win only because overpowered by superior numbers.

The Confederate generals had time and time again demonstrated their inexperience. They had failed again and again to arrive on the field promptly and press the attack. Lee's staff had failed, producing orders which confused the generals. However, there was no doubt that this was a resounding Confederate victory. Lee had driven McClellan from the gates of Richmond and pressed him back all the way to the James River. If they had failed in completely destroying the Federals, none the less they had brought back the Confederacy from the brink of defeat with a much needed victory.

Battle of Glendale

As in the previous battles of the Seven Days Campaign, the Confederate plan for the attack on McClellan on June 30th, 150 years ago today, was again executed badly. Lee intended for Jackson to cross White Oak Swamp and strike the Federal northern flank while the rest of the Confederate troops pushed east. For various reasons the divisions of Huger, Holmes and Magruder failed to have much effect on the battle. Huger encountered felled trees across his route, so he spent the day building a new one rather than clearing away the trees. As on the previous day Magruder was unsure what to do, and eventually he was ordered by Lee to join Holmes. Holmes made an attempt to assault the Federal left near Malvern Hill, but after suffering one repulse and loosing a few men he refused to attack again.

Battle of White Oak Swamp

Jackson was having troubles as well, in what would be his most inexplicable and controversial day of the war. He needed to rebuild a bridge across White Oak Swamp. Arriving in the area, he had found Federals in some strength on the other side of the water. He brought up artillery and drove them away from the bridge site, but when his men set to work on the bridge the Yankees returned and drove off the workmen. Colonel Thomas Munford of the cavalry found a ford downstream that seemed to be practicable and Wade Hampton built a makeshift bridge that could be used for infantry at least, if not artillery. However, when these developments were reported to Jackson, he did not act on them. Saying nothing, he walked off and went to sleep. He woke up for supper, and after falling asleep with a biscuit in his mouth, said, "Now, gentlemen, let us at once to bed, and rise with the dawn, and see if tomorrow we cannot do something." Many reasons have been suggested for Jackson's lack of aggressiveness, but the most likely appears to be sheer exhaustion. He had not gotten much sleep for many days, and had spent several nights in the saddle. He was probably simply too tired to continue to effectively lead his forces. This exhaustion was a great misfortune for the Confederacy.

Glendale Battlefield via CWT

Through these various mistakes of his generals, Lee was only left with two divisions to make the attack on the Federals, 20,000 men under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, who had already done hard fighting. At around 4:00 pm Lee decided he could wait no longer for the other columns to arrive, so he ordered the assaults to begin on the 40,000 Federals, in a two mile arch around Glendale intersection and Frazier's Farm, both of which would give the battle its name. The Confederates were sent in piecemeal, charging headlong at the Federals. Edmund Patterson of the 9th Alabama wrote:

Captain King gave us the command: “By the right of companies to the front, Battalion! Right Face! Double Quick! March!” We obeyed the command with a right good will and soon lessened the distance between us and the battery... We advanced in this manner until just before we reached the edge of the thicket, and within three hundred yards of the battery, the command was given: “By Company into line, March!” and the movement executed at the double-quick through us into line of battle without retarding our progress.. straight forward into that flame, into the jaws of death we pressed. Those of us left standing poured a volley at a distance of no more than 10 paces into the faces of the gunners. They fell across their guns and under the wheels, whole teams of horses plunging about in their mad agony, trampling under food the wounded.

Both sides fought hard. Many soldiers remembered desperate hand to hand fighting with bayonets ad gun butts. The front lines on both sides were reinforced and the fighting continued. The men fired at each other through the smoky underbrush, sometimes firing so quickly their guns became too hot to hold. Darkness finally ended the fighting, with the Federals hurt, but unbroken. Through the failure of the Army of Northern Virginia to concentrate on the Federals, they had lost perhaps their best chance of victory during the war. General Edward Porter Alexander wrote after the war:

"[W]hen one thinks of the great chances in General Lee's grasp that one summer afternoon, it is enough to make one cry to go over the story of how they were lost. And to think too that our Stonewall Jackson lost them. He had been great & grand & glorious before & he was so, too, many a time again, until he gave his life in battle within less than eleven months afterward. But never, before or after, did the fates put such a prize within our reach. In spite of all the odds against us, it is my individual belief that on two occasions in the four years we were within reach of military successes so great that we might have hoped to end the war with our independence, had we gathered the rich victories which seemed easily possible. ...[T]he first was Bull Run [in] July '61, when a vigorous pursuit might have caused the abandonment of Washington. ... This chance of June 30th '62 impresses me as the best of all."

Battle of Savage Station

150 years ago today the Confederates continued to execute Lee's complicated plan to crush the retreating army of McClellan. The battle began about 9 am when Magruder pushed his troops forward. Two Georgia regiments encountered the Federals, and the fighting continued for several hours before they disengaged. Although the Federals were vulnerable, retreating across his front, Magruder became confused and thought he was going to be attacked and overwhelmed. He requested and received reinforcements from Lee. The rest of the Confederate plan was not going smoothly either, with Jackson again moving slowly.

"Prince John" Magruder

The Federals were not immune from mistakes. Three corps had been assigned to stay around Savage Station, facing Magruder, but Heintzelman decided he was not needed and left, leaving only Sumner and Franklin.

After hesitating throughout the day Magruder finally ordered two and a half brigades forward at around 5 pm. They were supported by what was called the Land Merrimack, a 32 pounder cannon mounted on a railroad car and shielded with armor plates. This was the first use of an armored railroad battery in combat. The Federals responded with only a small force, so the fighting turned into a stalemate until darkness ended the conflict. Around 1,030 were lost by the Federals and 475 by Magruder. Magruder's cautiousness meant that the opportunity to destroy McClellan was wasted. Lee wrote him a letter in which he delivered an rebuke unusual for him:

"I regret much that you have made so little progress today in the pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the fruits of our victory that pursuit should be most vigorous. ... We must lose no more time or he will escape us entirely."

The next day would come quickly, bringing new opportunities for Lee to strike McClellan.

Field Hospital at Savage Station

McClellan Retreats

After his army was beaten back at Gaines Mill, Lee decided to retreat. Only one fifth of his army had been driven back at Gaines Mill. A large portion of the army had not yet fought. Additionally, he had enough troops that he could launch an trust at Richmond while holding back Lee. He could easily break through the thin Confederate lines, and it seems likely that he could have capture the city. However, that was not to be. McClellan was badly scared. He had been convinced by his scouts that he was outnumbered. He thought the attacks on his right were only a disguise for a major effort on his left. Throwing away all thought of an attack, instead he decided to fall back to the James River, where he could be protected by the gunboats. He blamed his situation on the government in Washington:

I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost. If I save this army now I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

One small Confederate success had convinced McClellan to give up the work of months of campaigning, and embark on a full scale retreat, or change of base as he liked to call it. McClellan himself went to the gunboats ahead of his army, abandoning direct control of his army in the retreat.

McClellan

Meanwhile, Lee did not sit idly by. He had his troops moving on June 28th in pursuit. He was not privy to McClellan's plans, so he had to determine whether he was going to retreat north to his base at White House, east to the James River, or attack Richmond. Sending out scouts to reconnoiter, he decided correctly that it was the second. Lee hoped to catch McClellan while his army was crossing the nearly impenetrable White Oak Swamp. He could crush one half of the army independently as it could receive little help from the rest on the other side of the swamp. This would be the best chance Lee had to destroy the Federals in the entire war, with the Federals moving across his front through favorable ground.

There was little fighting this day as the army moved, but Confederate general John B. Magruder did send out a reconnaissance in force at Golding's Farm. Although it was easily turned back, it served to further convince the Federals that they were being attacked from all sides.

Battle of Gaines Mill

McClellan had been badly shaken by Lee's attack on his right in the battle of Beaver Dam Creek. Although he had not suffered a serious reverse, he ordered the troops holding the line, under Fitz John Porter. Even before the battle was over he had written:

I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000.... I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur tomorrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders, it must rest where it belongs.

McClellan was overestimating the Confederates forces. Although pleased at his victory over Lee, McClellan thought Jackson would strike his rear where he least expected it. The morning after the battle, 150 years ago today, Lee, after finding the Federal position deserted, examined maps and planned his pursuit. He planned for Jackson and D. H. Hill to move around the Federal right, while Longstreet and A. P. Hill pressed on the front. Moving forward, they encountered Federal resistance around Gaines Mill. Lee described the field this way in his report:

The approach to this position was over an open plain, about a quarter of a mile wide, commanded by this triple line of fire and swept by the heavy batteries south of the Chickahominy. In front of his center and right the ground was generally open, bounded on the side of our approach by a wood, with dense and tangled undergrowth, and traversed by a sluggish stream, which converted the soil into a deep morass. The woods on the farther side of the swamp were occupied by sharpshooters, and trees had been felled to increase the difficulty of its passage and detain our advancing columns under the fire of infantry massed on the slopes of the opposite hills and of the batteries on their crests.

A. P. Hill Attacks

Jackson's men were not yet positioned on the flank, but A. P. Hill's men were anxious to attack. They went forward gallantly towards the strong Federal position, and although they fought hard all their attacks were useless. Gregg's, Branch's and Pender's brigades all tried attacks upon the Federal line, but they were all repulsed with heavy losses. Lee ordered no further attacks until Jackson arrived on the Union right. Jackson was late again. He had taken the wrong road, which meant much counter marching to reach the correct position. Finally, after many hours, Ewell's division arrived on the field and went forward to the attack. As his men moved forward, the tired men of A. P. Hill cried out, "You need not go in; we are whipped; you can't do anything." "Get out of our way we will show you how to do it!" replied Ewell's men, who were used to victory with Jackson in the Valley. However, they met the same fierce fire that had driven back Hill's men. Their assaults were unsuccessful, but they were able to hold onto their ground. To the right, Longstreet was preparing to launch a general assault on the hill. On the left, Jackson had finally arrived. When the news spread across the field, the tired soldiers rejoiced. The Army of the Valley had arrived to fight along side them, led by the famous Stonewall Jackson himself! "Tell them this affair must hang in suspense no longer!” Jackson ordered, “Sweep the field with the bayonet!" It took a long time to position thousands of men for the assault, and by 7:00 pm they were finally ready.

If you can form an idea of a hundred or more cannon and one hundred thousand or more small arms, and sometimes thousands of men - yelling at the top of their voice - then you can begin to understand the raging terror and the roaring, lumbering noise of this big battle that was going on.

Lee described the course of the battle in his report:

On the right the troops moved forward with steadiness, unchecked by the terrible fire from the triple lines of infantry on the hill, and the cannon on both sides of the river, which burst upon them as they emerged upon the plain. The dead and wounded marked the way of their intrepid advance, the brave Texans leading, closely followed by their no less daring comrades. The enemy were driven from the ravine to the first line of breastworks, over which our impetuous column dashed up to the entrenchments on the crest. These were quickly stormed, fourteen pieces of artillery captured, and the enemy driven into the field beyond. Fresh troops came to his support and he endeavored repeatedly to rally, but in vain. He was forced back with great slaughter until he reached the woods on the banks of the Chickahominy, and night put an end to the pursuit. Long lines of dead and wounded marked each stand made by the enemy in his stubborn resistance, and the field over which he retreated was strewn with the slain.

Confederate Breakthrough

Little pursuit was possible due to the lateness of the breakthrough. This had been a costly victory for Lee. He had lost 8,500 soldiers. Many regiments were completely decimated. The 1st Texas lost 600 of the 800 men who entered the battle. The Federals lost close to 7,000 men. The Confederates had made many mistakes this day. Many lives were wasted with repeated attacks on fixed positions. However, Jackson had finally arrived to sweep the field. It was clear that the Confederates had much to learn. The generals needed experience so that they could move in coordination and become an effective fighting force.

Battle of Mechanicsville

The Confederate army around Richmond launched its planned attack on McClellan 150 years ago today, in what was called the Battle of Mechanicsville by the South, and the Battle of Beaver Dam Creek by the North. The right of the Union army was in the small hamlet of Mechanicsville. Lee planned for Jackson, who was moving onto the Federal flank, to strike them in the morning. When he pushed them back, he would uncover the bridges over the Chickahominy River, which would allow the divisions of A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill and Longstreet to cross the river and join Jackson in the assault. They would continue to press forward, heading towards Cold Harbor, McClellan's supply depot.

Fitz John Porter, commander of the Federal right flank

However, not everything went according to plan. Jackson returned to his command tired and worn out after his meeting with Lee and the other generals. As they marched forward, he did not make the progress that he had expected. On the morning of June 26th, he ordered his troops to move at 2:30 am, as they were still far from their intended position. However, the columns did not start moving until dawn. Secrecy had also been lost. The Federals had been hearing rumors of Jackson's movement, but they got certain information of it when a deserter came into McClellan's lines and reported Jackson's presence.

The rest of the army did not know of the troubles that Jackson was facing. Longstreet and the Hills waited throughout the day for a courier or the sound of firing, but they heard nothing. Finally, A. P. Hill's patience wore out, as D. H. Hill's had at Seven Pines. “Three o'clock having arrived," Hill later wrote, "and no intelligence from Jackson or Branch, I determined to cross at once rather than hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it." Hill's 11,000 men struck hard, and drove the Federals back from Mechanicsville. However, they began reforming on Beaver Dam Creek, a marshy stream bordered by high banks on the northern side. The Federals cut down trees to obstruct the stream, and in some places dug entrenchments. Hill knew that it was a strong position, but he still continued to attack, hoping by pressing on them he could drive them back. However, his attacks were beaten back. The troops of Longstreet and D. H. Hill were on hand, but there was little they could do. Lee just hoped that if his men held the Federals in position, Jackson would finally arrive and strike their insecure right flank. D. H. Hill later wrote

The enemy had entrenchments of great strength and development on the other side of the creek, and had lined the banks with his magnificent artillery. The approach was over an open plain exposed to a murderous fire of all arms, and across an almost impassable stream. The result was, as might have been foreseen, a bloody and disastrous repulse. ... We were lavish of blood in those days, and it was thought a great thing to charge a battery of artillery or an earth-work lined with infantry.

One Federal soldier of the 9th Massachussets later wrote this of the assault,

As the enemy poured into the valley and across the hills and plains, by front and flank, in their thousands, they presented a find display. When about half way down the plains our magnificent batteries opened on them suddenly with shot and shell, followed by a terrific and well directed fire from the infantry. Round after round from our batteries and volley from our infantry, followed in rapid succession, caused at first great surprise; then consternation seized them as they witnessed the great slaughter all along their line. Flesh and blood could not stand it, and the disheartened enemy fell back as rapidly as the situation would admit of, their men falling at every step taken. ... The fighting along the whole line was kept up till dark. The more severely the enemy's lines were repulsed and beaten, the more bloodthirsty and desperate they became. The bravery of their repeated assaults upon our lines was something to be admired; but the slaughter they received from the fire of our troops was deplorable as an afterthought.

Beaver Dam Creek via CWT

Night put an end to the bloody engagement. Lee's plans had gone very badly. Jackson and his men had arrived on the field many hours after they were supposed to. Worn out, he had ordered his men to pitch camp although they could hear the sounds of battle ahead. A. P. Hill had driven back the Federals, but they had simply taken up a strong position and beat back useless, continued attacks. Lee passed no judgments, hoping that the next day the Confederate fortune could be redeemed.

Battle of Oak Grove

While Lee was planning to have Jackson join him in an attack on McClellan's right flank, McClellan was planning an offensive of his own. McClellan had been very cautious throughout the entire campaign, but now he had finally decided to attack. He wanted to capture the high ground around what was called Oak Grove, part of the Seven Pines battlefield, so that he would have a better artillery position for a siege. The troops selected for the attack were the divisions of Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearny. Meeting them would be the Confederate division of Benjamin Huger.

Huger

The battle opened at 8:30 am on June 25th, 150 years ago today, with a Union advance. The Federals pushed through the wooded ground, which was intersected by branches of White Oak Swamp. Most of the line made progress, but the rightmost brigade under Daniel Sickles encountered heavier resistance, throwing the line out of order. Huger, sensing an opportunity, ordered a counterattack by the brigade of Ambrose Wright. One of his regiments wore colorful Zouave uniforms, which were more common on the Northern side. The Federals thought they were their own men, and did not fire until the last moment. The battle finally turned when the inexperienced 25th North Carolina delivered a perfect volley, breaking Sickles's brigade. Reinforcements were sent forward, and McClellan was notified of the reverse.

McClellan was not on the field, but he was trying to manage the battle by telegraph. Although he did not know the details of the fighting, he ordered the men back to their trenches around 10:30 am. However, when he arrived on the field a few hours later, he realized the fighting had not gone as badly as he had thought. He ordered the battle resumed at around 1:00 pm. The fighting continued until nightfall, the Federals trying to regain the ground they had won in the morning. By the end of the day McClellan's men gained around 600 yards at the cost of over 1,000 casualties on both sides. The battle did not continue the next day, for Robert E. Lee's plan would go into action, derailing McClellan's offensive prospects.