Siege of Nashville – Day 2

Federal entrenchments

On the morning of December 16th, 150 years ago today, the Federal troops outside Nashville prepared to attack John Bell Hood's new position. It was much shorter and stronger than the previous day's, and the flanks were secured to prevent a repetition of the previous day's disaster. However, they did have critical weaknesses. On Shy's Hill, some of the highest ground on the Confederate left, the entrenchments were on the actual crest of the hill rather than the military crest, a little lower. This meant that the attacking Federals would, for a time, be hidden from Confederate shot as they charged up the hill. Thomas's plan from the previous day remained unchanged – to feint on the right and then push hard on the rebel left.

Unlike the previous day, the diversionary attack did convince Hood to shift forces away from the truly threatened point. Four brigades attacked the right around 3 pm. Most were turned back by the heavy Confederate fire, but the 13th United States Colored Troops continued to pressed forward. They charged up to the Confederate parapets before being driven back, losing a flag and 40% of their strength in the process. Cheatham, commanding the corps on the Confederate left, had to stretch his line even thinner to protect the flank and rear from Union cavalry incursions.

McArthur

With this golden opportunity on the Confederate right, the Federals failed to move. John Schofield was ordered to make the attack with his corps, but he believed he was outnumbered and requested reinforcements. When these arrived, he still did nothing. With sunset not far distant, Brigadier General John McArthur decided to take matters into his own hands. He announced to his commanders that his division would attack in five minutes unless he received orders to the contrary. No orders arrived, and so his three brigades moved out toward the Confederate left on Shy's Hill. His attack was very successful. The misplacement of the entrenchments meant that the hill could be captured without much difficultly, and another brigade was so close on the heels of the Confederate skirmishers that they entered the rebel works with them. One Federal officers wrote:

It was more like a scene in a spectacular drama than a real incident in war. The hillside in front, still green, dotted with boys in blue swarming up the slope; the wavering flags; the smoke slowly rising through the leafless tree-tops and drifting across the valleys; the wonderful outburst of musketry; the ecstatic cheers; the multitude racing for life down in the valley below …. As soon as the other divisions farther to the left saw and heard the doings on their right, they did not wait for orders. Everywhere, by a common impulse, they charged the works in front, and carried them in a twinkling.

With the left crushed, much of Hood's army fell apart. Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee wrote:

Such a scene I never saw. The army was panic-stricken. The woods everywhere were full of running soldiers. Our officers were crying, 'Halt! Halt!' and trying to rally and re-form their broken ranks. The Federals would dash their cavalry in amongst us, and ever their cannon joined in the charge. … Wagon trains, cannon, artillery, cavalry, and infantry were all blended in inextricable confusion.

Through the night of December 16th the Confederates retreated, with part of Lee's corps still intact and serving as rearguard and repelling strikes by Union cavalry. Over the next few days the rebels pushed forward into Alabama. The Union infantry could make little pursuit due to a missing pontoon train, and two newly arrived divisions of Confederate cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forrest handled the attacks of the Federal troopers.

USCT monument at the Nashville Cemetery. Source. 

In this battle the Federals lost around 387 killed, 2,562 wounded, and 112 missing. The Confederate casualties are harder to pin down, but they probably lost around 2,500 killed and wounded and more than 4,500 prisoners. This battle was the deathnell of Hood's Army of the Tennessee. They had entered Tennessee with 38,000 men. When they returned to the safety of Alabama they had about 15,000 men. Much of the blame for this debacle was due to John Bell Hood, who had wasted his army in bloody frontal attacks, and had continued to press on in the invasion against vastly superior Federal forces. He resigned his command in January, and the shattered remnants of his command were integrated into other forces.

Siege of Nashville – Day 1

After his bloody defeat at Franklin and the retreat of the Union, John Bell Hood continued to press forward into Tennessee. He arrived at Nashville on December 2^nd. He had only 30,000 men to George Thomas's 55,000. Too weak to attempt an assault, Hood settled into four miles of defensive positions, hoping that Thomas would attack him. He detached several brigades and sent them on diversions to try to lure Thomas out of the city. But Thomas, the “Rock of Chickamauga,” was not fooled, and would not attack until he was ready. Although Sherman was content for the rebels to busy themselves in Tennessee while he marched through Georgia, this did not sit well with Lincoln. The president remarked, “This seems like the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing and let the rebels raid the country.” Grant urged Thomas to attack, and was just about to remove him from command when he finally did.

Attack on the Confederate Redoubts

The attack began on December 15^th. The Confederate forces were too weak to completely invest Nashville. Instead of anchoring their flanks on either side of the river, Hood had to leave his flanks relatively exposed. Thomas planned to make a diversion on the Confederate right while the rest of the army struck their left. Wilson's cavalry moved on the far end of the wheeling Union forces, driving away Confederate outposts and ending up nearly in their rear. Federal infantry began attacking the southern redoubts at 2:30 pm. Some of the rebels put up a good defense, but at the end of the day the Union troops held all five of the redoubts covering the Confederate flank. With his position compromised, Hood fell back about a mile to a new and stronger line, where the fighting would resume on the morrow.

Hood

Battle of Franklin

While Sherman's army was on its infamous march to the sea, the Confederate army under Hood which had been driven out of Atlanta was not idle. Hood led his men North, hoping to cut Sherman's supply line with the aid of Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry, forcing him to turn North to chase the Confederates. At first Sherman's movements were hampered by troops that he positioned to watch for Hood. But finally he decided to head off south, leaving the army of George Thomas to cope with Hood. Hood's hope was that by moving into Tennessee he would force Sherman to turn back from his march across Georgia to pursue him.

The Confederates marched quickly, trying to destroy separate Union corps before they could unite. On November 29th, Hood sent two corps to flank John Scofield's two infantry corps. The rebels were able to reach a position from which they had a great opportunity to strike the Yankees, but through mistakes of the Confederate command the attack was never made. That night Schofield moved 12 miles north to Franklin, Tennessee. The Confederates followed the next day, and found the Federals in an entrenched position. The aggressive John Bell Hood was determined to destroyed the Federals before they made it to the even stronger works of Nashville, so he ordered a frontal attack to be made that evening. Some of his generals expressed worry at the formidable works, but they were determined to capture them. As the famed Patrick Cleburne said, "[I]f we are to die, let us die like men."

On the evening of November 30, Hood's 20,000 men charged across two miles of open ground against the prepared Federal works. They first smashed two advance Federal brigades, and in the center of the line around the Carter House, they broke through the main line. Federals quickly counterattacked, and after hours of hand to hand fighting contained the Confederate foothold, and finally regained their lines. The Confederate attack was eventually beaten back all along the line. This charge has been called by many the Pickett's Charge of the West, but in many ways it far exceeded it. The gallant Confederates at Franklin were attacking earthworks. They suffered 6,000 casualties, many more than Pickett, including Cleburne and eleven other generals. Although the Federal army retreated the next day, the Confederate Army of the Tennessee was crushed.

Battle of Peachtree Creek

After replacing Joseph Johnston at the head of the Army of Tennessee, it did not take John Bell Hood long to strike a blow. On July 19^th he received news that the Union army was split in two, with Thomas' Army of the Cumberland heading directly for Atlanta, while the Army of the Ohio and the Army of the Tennessee moved to the east, heading towards the railroad supply lines. Hood planned to attack Thomas while he was crossing Peachtree Creek, thus neutralizing the superior numbers of the Yankees. This was a plan that Johnston had been developing before he was removed from command.

Thomas

The Confederates attacked on July 20^th, 150 years ago today. Hood committed two corps to the attack, Hardee's and Stewart's, while Cheatham's stood in place before the other Union army. The plan was to strike at 1 pm, but it took too long to keep the three corps aligned in position. The rebels finally attacked by 4 pm, but by that time Thomas had not long crossed the creek, but the men had thrown up significant defensive works. Hardee's attack was badly executed and repulsed by the Federals without much danger. Stewart's blow struck harder. In his attack two Federal brigades were driven back, and nearly an entire regiment captured. But Thomas' men counterattacked, and with the help of their artillery stopped the Confederate advance. Before Hardee could throw in his reserve he received an order from Hood to send them to reinforce Cheatham, and thus the battle ended for the day. About 1,900 Federals and 2,500 Confederates fell. 

Graves after the battle

Attack on Joseph Johnston

There were several movements across the Western Theater in conjunction with Sherman's advance on Meridian, Mississippi in February, 1864. One of these was in Dalton, Georgia, where George Thomas advanced against the lines of Joseph Johnston to see if his position on Rocky Face Ridge was weakened by sending off reinforcements to resist Sherman. From February 22-27 the Federals probed the Confederate positions, but after some heavy skirmishing they found no weaknesses. The Yankees lost about 300 men, the Confederates, 150. Johnston had chosen his position well.

Battle of Orchard Knob

Tennessee River

After the battle of Chickamauga, the Confederate army under Braxton Bragg pursued the Federals to Chattanooga, where a siege began. Ulysses Grant and reinforcements arrived in the town, and the Federals were able to reopen their supply line. Bragg divided his army, sending Longstreet to fight Bragg in east Tennessee. In the mean time, the Federal forces increased. Sherman's forces began arriving on November 20th.

Grant

Grant planned to use Sherman's and Hooker's men to attack Bragg, positioned on the heights around the town. Grant thought that Thomas's troops, who had been defeated at Chickamauga, would not be able to fight. On November 23rd, 150 years ago today, Grant got word that Bragg was abandoning his position. This was not true, he was just sending more men to East Tennessee. By this time, because of the Union reinforcement and the division of the Confederate army, Grant had 76,000 men available to fight, while Bragg had only 43,000.

Grant did not want the Confederates to escape, so he ordered Thomas to attack Orchard Knob, a small rise in front of the main Confederate position on Missionary Ridge. This movement was intended to be a reconnaissance in force to determine the strength of the enemy. At 1:30 pm almost 15,000 Federals moved out in long lines across the fields. They were moving on only 600 Confederates, who fired only one volley before making a hasty retreat.

Orchard Knob

This movement showed Bragg the Federal's intentions, and he recalled the troops he had just sent to Longstreet. Cleburne's division returned in time to participate in the battle, and they would do very good service. The Confederates had neglected to fortify Missionary Ridge during all the weeks of the siege, but the orders were finally given and that work began. But these new entrenchments were constructed with a fatal flaw. They were built on the very top of the ridge, rather than a little below it, on what is called the military crest. This meant that they would not be able see the Yankees for much of their climb up the hill.

Orchard Knob

The Union decided to continue their attack on Bragg, and the generals reworked their plans. The right would attack the Confederate positions on Lookout Mountain, Thomas would continue to press the center at Missionary Ridge, and Sherman would cross the Tennessee River to attack the top of Missionary Ridge on the left.

Battle of Chickamauga – Day 2

As the day dawned over the bloody field of Chickamauga on, Sunday, September 20th, William Rosecrans, commander of the Union army, was riding along his lines, encouraging the troops. They had been sorely tested the day before with several Confederate attacks nearly breaking their line, but Rosecrans urged them to fight on, saying, “Fight today as well as you did yesterday, and we shall whip them!”

Across the field, Confederate commander Braxton Bragg had planned to attack at daylight, but the orders he had sent to D. H. Hill had been lost. When morning came Hill was unprepared, still getting his troops into position. They would attack on their right, where the Federal right had formed into a semicircle around the Kelly House. The Yankees had spent their night profitably, building breastworks to better defend themselves. Finally, at about 9:45 am, the Confederate attack began.

On the Confederate far right was Breckinridge's division. It was in such a position that his two rightmost brigades extended beyond the left of George Thomas's breastworks. Thomas, seeing that he was flanked, requested reinforcements. He withdrew two brigades from his line and threw them in front of Breckinridge. They fought hard, and although they were driven back, they bought enough time for Van Cleve to bring his division up from the right. Thomas was able to hold back the Confederate attack with these troops, but he did not feel his line was secure. As the battle raged, he requested Rosecrans to send him more troops from the center and right. Breckinridge and Cleburne continued to press forward, meeting heavy resistance. Liddell's and Gist's men were brought up and the attack was renewed, but fresh Union troops were moved to that portion of the line and no progress could be made. Stewart's division gained some success, but they were driven back by a Federal counter attack. Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry were dismounted and fighting on foot. When Hill saw them, he asked what infantry they were. When he was told they were Forrest's cavalry, he said:

General Forrest, I wish to congratulate you and those brave men moving across that field like veteran infantry upon their magnificent behavior. In Virginia I made myself extremely unpopular with the cavalry because I said I had not seen a dead man with spurs on. No one could speak disparagingly of such troops as yours.

By noon, the attacks slowed down. Polk and Bragg had failed to break Thomas's line, protected as it was by breastworks. As on the previous day, Bragg had not concentrated enough strength on one point to crush the line, and instead dispersed the blow. But Rosecrans had a problem. Because of the heavy pressure on the left, he had sent Thomas many reinforcements, leaving only four divisions on the right.

It was Longstreet's turn to attack. Because of all the troops rushed to Thomas, a hole had developed in the center of the Union line. Rosecrans had received false information about a gap in his line, and in giving orders to correct it, actually created a gap. Longstreet got permission from Bragg to attack with his wing. Instead of the piecemeal attacks used in the battle so far, throwing in only one a division at a time, Longstreet marshaled four divisions with which to crush the Federals. He ordered his men forward at 11:15 am. Confederate Bushrod Johnson wrote:

The scene now presented was unspeakably grand. The resolute and impetuous charge, the rush of our heavy columns sweeping out from the shadow and gloom of the forest into the open fields flooded with sunlight, the glitter of arms, the onward dash of artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the foe, the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust, the smoke, the noise of fire-arms—of whistling balls and grape-shot and of bursting shell—made up a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeur.

Longstreet's men went right through the hole in the Federal line, past the Brotherton Farm, crushing any resistance they encountered. By noon he was a mile deep in the Federal center, having capturing 17 cannon and over 1000 prisoners along the way. Soon the entire left and center of the Yankee line was one race to get away from Longstreet's advancing men. But the Texas Brigade was struck with a counterattack from a Union unit, and driven into retreat. Hood, seeing his old brigade in full retreat, rode to rally them. He was shot through the leg, and carried off the field. Although such woods were frequently fatal during, he had his leg amputated and survived. This left him with only two limbs, as he had lost the use of his arm in another battle.

Having crushed through the Union center, Longstreet ordered his men to execute a right wheel and turn on Thomas. This complicated maneuver took time to preform, and during the lull he ordered that his men be fed to prepare them for further fighting. Bragg was annoyed that his battle plan had was unsuccessful, and that Longstreet had developed his own plan, and it was winning the day. So he rode off the field and left the management of the battle to his subordinates.

Rosecrans

Bragg was not the only commander leaving the field. Rosecrans himself, joined by two of his corps commanders and thousands of men, was making off as fast as possible, believing further defense useless. Most officers completely lost their heads and tried to get away just like the common soldiers. But not all of the Federals were retreating. George Thomas remained on the field to organize the Union defense, and his firmness in stemming the Union rout would earn him the title the “Rock of Chickamauga.” He established a line of defense on Horseshoe Ridge, at right angles to the original position. Many Federals rallied there, still determined to resist the victorious southerners. They declared with resolution, “We will hold this ground or go to heaven from it.”

Through the afternoon waves of Confederates attacked Thomas's troops on Horseshoe Ridge. At 4:30 pm Longstreet's troops advanced. The fighting centered around Snodgrass Hill, upon which Longstreet made 25 attacks. The Federals were holding firm with hard fighting, but Thomas knew that this could not last forever. He was attacked on two sides by forces twice his number. He realized that at some point the position had to fold, and so he determined to conduct an orderly retreat. The gradual retreat began at 5:30 pm and continued over the next two hours. A rearguard of three regiments was left to defend the hill to the last. When they ran out of ammunition, they stood firm with bayonets. Refusing to abandon the position, they were finally surrounded and forced to surrender.

Horseshoe Ridge

The Federals retreated during the evening, routed but not destroyed. Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga had been able to put up a last ditch defense so that the Union army was saved from complete destruction. This good defense would have important implications in the campaign, and it prevented a Union army from being nearly wiped off the map.

Thomas

The Confederates were elated at their victory, the first real victory won by Bragg's army. They let out cheers the like of which would be never heard again. They had captured 8000 prisoners, 51 cannon, over 23,000 rifles and much ammunition and other supplies. It was the largest quantity of supplies captured in one battle in the war. But it had been a costly battle. Rosecrans had lost 16,170 men, Bragg, 18,454. The total of almost 35,000 was a huge number. It was the second bloodiest battle of the war, only exceeded by Gettysburg. D. H. Hill wrote after the war,

There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Cickamauga .... He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Cickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope.

Battle of Chickamauga – Day 1

On September 18th Braxton Bragg's advance units encountered the Union army and captured a crossing over Chickamauga Creek. But as had been done several times during this campaign, the Confederates failed to exploit any surprise they might have gained. When he advanced on September 19th, 150 years ago today, the fighting would develop into one of the bloodiest battles in the Civil War.

As the Confederate units prepared to move toward the Yankees, they did not know the information on which their plan was based was faulty. The Federal troops were further north than they expected. Bragg had planned to strike Crittenden's crops, at Lee and Gordon's Mill, which he assumed was Rosecrans's left flank. What he did not know was that the Union command had moved Thomas's corps beyond Crittenden. The battle began almost by accident this morning, with a skirmish over water resulting in a Union division being sent to clear off what was believed to be a single Confederate brigade on the west side of Chickamauga Creek. In fact, it was the entire rebel army.

September 19, Morning

These northern soldiers encountered much more resistance than they anticipated from men which turned out to be Forrest's cavalry men on the Confederate flank. The battle swayed back and forth throughout the morning as each side, threw more men into the increasing fight on the northern portion of the battle. Colonel John T. Wilder wrote this portion of the fight lines which apply well to the entire battle:

All this talk of generalship displayed on either side is sheer nonsense. There was no generalship in it. It was a soldier's fight purely, wherein the only question involved was the question of endurance. The two armies came together like two wild beats, and each fought as long as it could stand up in a knock-down and drag-out encounter. If there had been any high order of generalship displayed, the disasters to both armies might have been less.

September 19, Afternoon

The fighting was furious in the thick woods of Chickamauga. In the rolling, wooded ground, commanders could see little, and it was what historian Steven Woodworth called “a soldier's battle.” As the day progressed, each side brought up more troops to add to the battle in the upper part of the field. The third wave of men Bragg threw into the fight was the division of Alexander Stewart. He was ordered to move to the Confederate right, but instead he attacked the left on his own authority. It was an opportune moment, and hitting three of Thomas's brigades around Brotherton Farm, he drove them into a rout after a fierce fight he drove them into a rout. The rebels rushed through the woods after the retreating bluecoats, and succeeded in crossing the Lafayette road. George Thomas brought up two more divisions and threw them into the fight against Stewart, driving the weary men back.

Brotherton Farm

Seeing an opportunity John Bell Hood ordered in his Texas division from Lee's Army of Northern Virginia to aid Stewart, striking on the left of his position. Hood's gallant boys chard through the woods and again broke the Federal line. Pressing forward, they penetrated so deep that some units were very close to Rosecrans's headquarters. But at this critical juncture two more Federal divisions arrived from the south, and falling into line, halted Hood's men and pushed them back some distance.

September 19, evening

As darkness was falling over the bloody field, Bragg ordered Patrick Cleburne's men to make another attack on the Union left, where there had been a lull in the fighting. Cleburne's three brigades stretched a mile through the woods, and they rushed forward, striking hard the blue line with twice their numbers. One Federal wrote of the attack:

On they come, in the very face of fire and lead, until the strike the right of our regiment... but when too close to load and fire, the rebels were clubbed over the head and checked for the moment, while, instinctively, both sides recoiled a few steps without breaking the lines, and with that cool, deliberate determination and recklessness which characterizes all soldiers after breathing an atmosphere strongly impregnated with powder smoke, these deadly foes practiced the art of loading and firing in a manner that I believe was never surpassed on any battle field during the rebellion.

Confederate attack

Cleburne's men pushed the Federals back, but were ultimately unable to break the line. When darkness made further fighting impossible, the men made camp all across the battlefield wherever they happened to be. The Confederates could hear the Federals digging entrenchments that they would have to attack the next morning. Both sides suffered as they lay on the fields over which they had fought. As one Yankee recorded,

How we suffered that night no one knows. Water could not be found; the rebels had possession of the Chickamauga, and we had to do without. Few of us had blankets, and the night was very cold. All looked with anxiety for the coming of dawn; for although we had given the enemy a rough handling, he had certainly used us very hard.

Daniel Harvey Hill

The day's fighting was over. The Confederates had hit the Federals hard. On several occasions they had even penetrated the line. But in the end, Union reinforcements arrived and the Confederates were unable to give the final blow to rout them. Confederate General D. H. Hill explained what he thought had hindered their success:

Unfortunately for the Confederates, there was no general advance, as there might have been along the whole line - an advance that must have given a more decisive victory on the 19th than was gained on the 20th. It was desultory fighting from right to left, without concert, and at inopportune times. It was the sparring of the amateur boxer, and not the crushing blows of the trained pugilist.

Bragg did not focus on one area of the Union line and throw all his strength into it. He had come close to victory, two attacks came within sight of the Federal headquarters, but not enough reserved arrived to finish the blow. He moved his focus the line. Aiming everywhere, he hit nowhere hard enough.

Although the attacks had been uncoordinated and the Federals had not been broken, the Confederates were hopeful for the morrow. More of Longstreet's men arrived from Virginia late that night, bringing fresh reinforcements to Bragg. Bragg reorganized the army into two wings, the right was given to Leonidas Polk and the left to Longstreet. This arrangement offended the testy, D. H. Hill, the other Lieutenant General on the field, who was angry that he was not made a wing commander.

On the other side of the field Rosecrans held a council of war with his generals. They agreed that an attempt to attack would be futile, as they had only a few fresh troops and were outnumbered by the Confederates. Rosecrans decided not to retreat, hoping that Bragg would fall back the next day, as he had at Perryville and Murfresborro. But Bragg would not retreat, and the terrible fighting would resume the next day.